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ABSTRACT 
 
Emerging diseases in Canada threaten the wellbeing of humans, domestic and farmed 
animals, as well as wildlife. Canada, like many nations, struggles to manage diseases that 
cross boundaries, both geographically and in species. This has led to a heavy reliance on 
governance networks to coordinate the knowledge and resources needed to develop 
management approaches. As governance networks often exist in an informal or ad hoc 
capacity and at the same time attempt to solve complex or expansive policy problems beyond 
the ability of any one agency, the issue of network resilience is examined to explore how 
networks and their membership can mitigate network failure. 
Through two case studies of wildlife disease incidents in Canada (Chronic wasting disease 
and White nose syndrome), I examine how the wildlife health network in Canada developed 
its disease management approaches as well as recommendations to provincial and federal 
governments. Using primary sources, I evaluate the network’s activities, attitudes and 
behaviours to assess if characteristics associated with resilience (slack in resources, adaptive 
capacity and situation awareness) are present and if they contribute to positive outcomes. 
Greater presence of resilient characteristics- slack in resources, adaptive capacity and 
situation awareness-were present in the case with better policy outcomes, however, the 
analysis reveals that the concept of resilience is limited as a useful tool when examined in 
the broader context. Governance networks are often limited by the structural constraints of 
their environment, including scarce resources and a lack of self-determination.  In this 
network, an additional factors exists to complicate analysis: disease type and severity. The 
relative ease with which an emerging disease can be understood and management appears 
to contribute significantly to the network’s success. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BSE: Bovine spongiform encephalopathy is a fatal neurodegenerative disease that affects cattle 
and can be transmitted to humans as Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Also referred to as Mad 
cow disease. 
CFIA: Canadian Food Inspection Agency. 
COSEWIC: Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada is a committee of 
scientific advisors tasked with evaluating applications for Species at Risk listings for the federal 
government. 
CWD: Chronic wasting disease is a fatal transmissible spongiform encephalopathy that affects 
cervids (members of the family Cervidae including deer, elk and moose).  
CWDC: Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee is an advisory body comprised of federal, 
provincial and territorial wildlife directors, including Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada and Park Canada. They provide leadership for the development and coordination of 
policies and programs that support wildlife health and biodiversity. 
CWHC:  Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative is a partnership of Canada’s five veterinary 
colleges committed to generating knowledge, surveillance and policy interventions needed to 
assess and manage wildlife health in Canada.  
CWS: Canadian Wildlife Service is an agency of Environment Canada under the Environmental 
Stewardship branch. They are responsible for federal wildlife management. 
IOC: Inter-agency Oversight Committee is the official name for the Chronic wasting disease 
network under the direction of the Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee. 
NWDS: National Wildlife Disease Strategy is a disease management framework created to fill in 
the gaps in wildlife disease management in Canada. 
SARA: Species at Risk Act is a federal law that provides the Minister of Environment with the 
authority to declare wildlife at risk of extinction. The Act requires that the government provide 
remedies to mitigate the extinction threat. 
TSE: Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy is a class of infectious disease that affects the 
brain and nervous system of animals and humans, resulting in impairment of brain function. 
Chronic wasting disease and Bovine spongiform encephalopathy are both TSEs. Also referred to 
as prion diseases. 
 ix 
 
WNS: White Nose Syndrome is a disease that is caused by fungus Pseudogymnoascus 
destructans which affects hibernating bats, causing them to wake from hibernation and expend 
energy before an adequate food supply has emerged.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past 75 years, there has been an unprecedented rise in the number of emerging 
infectious diseases (EIDs) affecting animal and human health, as well as the global economy 
(Jones et al., 2008). Within Canada, a number of EIDs have affected farmed animals, wildlife 
and human populations just in the last 15 years. These diseases include Bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (or Mad cow disease), Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 
Chytridiomycosis, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (known as H5N1), Influenza A (H1N1), 
Bovine tuberculosis, Avian botulism, White nose syndrome and Chronic wasting disease. Many 
of these diseases are classified as EIDs because the disease is either entirely new, new to the 
affected population or area, or a variation on a previously encountered disease. While diseases 
are considered a natural part of an ecosystem, the threat presented by a foreign or emerging 
infectious disease can irreparably damage an environment by eradicating a species that is vital to 
the ecosystem (Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative, 2004). The introduction of new diseases 
globally through increased travel, trade and environmental degradation has decimated animal 
species, caused human health crises and created economic havoc through trade restrictions and 
travel warnings (Miller, Farnsworth & Malmberg, 2013).  
The influx of these diseases has led to concern about the ability of Canadian governments 
to effectively manage animal health epidemics. In addition to new research, surveillance and 
treatment options that must be developed and implemented in Canada to ensure the general 
health of farmed animals and wildlife, there are coordination gaps that need to be addressed 
between various levels of government. The Canadian legal framework surrounding animal health 
is divided not only between wildlife and farmed animals, falling under natural resource and 
agriculture departments respectively, but also by territorial divisions. The federal government 
has responsibility for migratory birds and aquatic species as well as terrestrial wildlife on federal 
lands. Provincial and territorial governments have jurisdiction over terrestrial wildlife on their 
lands. Both levels of government have the ability to declare endangered or threatened species at 
risk and are then required to address conservation and/or repopulation.  Experts in wildlife 
disease have suggested that these jurisdictional divisions have allowed gaps to emerge where 
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there is uncertainty about authority and the responsibility to provide appropriate policy responses 
(Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative, 2004). 
Attempting to address an emerging animal disease epidemic requires a high level of 
collaboration and coordination, as diseases can often be transmitted between farmed animals and 
wildlife, and beyond jurisdictional boundaries. Patricia Farnese (2014) has argued that the formal 
legal and regulatory framework in Canada fails to consider the role of wildlife in emerging 
diseases and prioritizes animals of consumptive use (such as livestock or farmed game). She 
further suggests that the public and animal health regimes are not structured to efficiently tackle 
emerging diseases and that the regulatory silos in which human, animal and wildlife health 
operate only exacerbate the problem.  
There is no centralized governance body for addressing emerging diseases in wildlife in 
Canada. Instead, there exist two official forums to discuss policy and collaboration. The first is 
the Joint Ministers Council responsible for Forestry, Wildlife, Endangered Species and Fisheries 
and Aquaculture which is comprised of the provincial, federal and territorial Ministers 
responsible for wildlife in their jurisdiction. This group meets sporadically and did not meet in a 
formal capacity between 2006 and 2015. The second, more active, forum is the Canadian 
Wildlife Directors Committee (CWDC). It provides accountability, leadership and coordination 
for policy priorities and collaboration across the country with regards to wildlife and 
biodiversity. The CWDC consists of the directors of wildlife ministries for all provinces and 
territories, as well as the regional and national directors of the Canadian Wildlife Service and 
representatives of Fisheries and Oceans Canada and Parks Canada. The group meets regularly by 
teleconference as well as biannually in person to discuss pressing developments, formalize 
policy collaborations and hear from stakeholders and experts on important issues (Technical 
Working Group, 2005). 
Between 2001 and 2002, the CWDC conducted an evaluation of the capacity of Canada’s 
wildlife health infrastructure and concluded that a resource and knowledge gap exists in Canada 
(Technical Working Group, 2005). The variety of existing and emerging wildlife diseases and 
the divergent approaches taken in jurisdictions reflecting varying priorities and crises, along with 
small operating budgets made coordination of policy responses to disease outbreaks challenging. 
In an attempt to mitigate the challenges facing wildlife health officials, the Joint Ministers 
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Council agreed that a national wildlife disease strategy should be developed to identify clear 
procedures for dealing with wildlife disease outbreaks.  
In order to address the absence of useful policy and formalize the collaboration needed to 
effectively address wildlife disease, the Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee (CWDC) 
proposed a formal strategy that would provide procedures and responsibilities for crucial 
activities to mitigate disease while being general enough to be applicable to the vast majority of 
potential disease scenarios. The CWDC commissioned the Canadian Wildlife Health 
Cooperative, a network of academic researchers from Canada’s veterinary colleges, to author a 
strategy that would bridge the gaps in communication, knowledge, coordination and funding 
between various jurisdictions by standardizing regulations, strengthening surveillance and 
facilitating response when the next disease outbreak occurred. (Canadian Wildlife Health 
Cooperative, 2004) The strategy was approved by both the CWDC and the Joint Ministers 
Council, as a tool to guide action (Technical Working Group, 2005). 
The National wildlife disease strategy is a management framework that seeks to minimize 
the impact of wildlife disease by identifying and filling critical gaps in the health infrastructure 
as well as improving response coordination. The Strategy has not been fully implemented across 
sectors, nor have resources been made available for its implementation. However, the wildlife 
health community in Canada has used it to build the groundwork for their approach to 
collaboration on wildlife disease management. One of the key elements of this work has been the 
development of a governance network that has coordinated the work of government scientists 
and policy makers, as well as academics and non-governmental organizations facing particular 
disease threats.  
Governance networks have become an increasingly prevalent approach to deal with 
complex, multijurisdictional policy problems. These problems generally transcend the 
geographical divisions and/or bureaucratic partitions through which most government 
departments and agencies are required to work. The network response allows for collaboration 
and coordination between various levels and areas of government as well as non-governmental 
organizations and stakeholders in the private or academic sectors. In its basic form the network is 
a collection of interested and knowledgeable individuals, organizations and/or governments who 
work together to tackle a policy problem that cannot be dealt with effectively by a single entity 
(Sørensen & Torfing, 2005). This network, centred around the Canadian Wildlife Health 
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Cooperative, has worked to collaborate policy responses for Chronic wasting disease, West nile 
virus, White nose syndrome, Avian Influenza, and Chytridiomycosis across the country.  
 
1.1 The Problem 
 
While the network approach taken in the Canadian wildlife health sector addresses a 
portion of the gaps in the wildlife health system it does so in an informal fashion. Those in power 
at the provincial, territorial and federal levels have allowed this network approach to become the 
default response to wildlife health crises without having a clear picture of the network’s capacity 
and ability to sustain itself. The absence of legislation and regulations that would formalize the 
roles and responsibilities of policies like the Canadian Wildlife Disease Strategy, has left what 
Farnese (2014) calls a regulatory deficit in wildlife health policy that the network struggles to 
close. The network has no consistent source of funding and no formal source of authority. It is 
self-organized and often works without official consent from all levels of government. There are 
often no formal agreements made between governments regarding the work of the network and 
funding is contract-based and temporary.  The network, in addition to its primary mandate of 
tackling disease threats, has to overcome the barriers of working with insular bureaucratic 
regimes across jurisdictions and sectors to achieve policy outcomes. 
Governance network theorists tend to assume that network participants are able to 
contend with flexible arrangements and processes requiring high levels of negotiation and 
fluidity, however there has been little to no work done regarding what kinds of behaviours and 
attitudes are required by participants to flourish in this environment. It is essential to conduct 
research that explores what limitations exist for governance networks to achieve their objectives 
and to identify how successful networks overcome barriers. Ensuring a network is functional and 
able to produce positive policy outcomes over time should be a key objective of the government 
entities that are embracing this form of governance. At a minimum, governments should be 
confident that public expenditures spent on the network’s activities contribute to positive 
solutions. 
A question emerges given what this network does and the conditions under which they do 
it: what enables them to sustain their activities and work towards minimizing the disease threat to 
wildlife, farmed animals and humans in the face of numerous obstacles? The answer proposed in 
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this paper is resilience. Resilience is the ability to continue making positive adjustments in the 
face of obstacles (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). It is not a binary state but rather a multifaceted 
characteristic developed and strengthened by awareness and experience.  
In this thesis, I will argue that to sustain network activities over time and in the face of 
stressors governance networks require resilience, which is characterized by adaptive capacity, 
situation awareness and slack in financial, social and cognitive resources. This thesis is an 
exploration of how attitudes, behaviours and actions shape the resilience of a governance 
network and how resilience affects the outcomes of a governance network’s activities. By 
examining two cases in which the Canadian wildlife health network participated- the emergence 
of Chronic wasting disease in Western Canada and the emergence of White nose syndrome in 
Eastern Canada-, I will explore how this network uses resilient characteristics to adjust to 
stressors and how greater resilience facilitates the achievement of policy goals. 
1.2 The Network 
 
The wildlife health network in Canada is comprised of individuals employed as wildlife 
biologists and policy advisors with a number of government departments and agencies, as well as 
independent academics with expertise in wildlife veterinary biology and pathology, members of 
environmental interest groups and the aforementioned Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative 
(see Figure 1-1).  
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Figure 1-1: The wildlife health network in Canada 
 
Many of the provincial and federal government employees who participate in the network 
are wildlife biologists who also hold positions with Canadian universities or have research 
partnerships with the CWHC. Similarly, many of the academics in the network have worked on 
contracts for provincial, territorial and federal governments. Most of the relationships in the 
network were formed through collaborative work on wildlife issues. Members working in 
government have large portfolios in wildlife health which means they can represent their 
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jurisdiction on a number of topics, allowing the network to have fairly consistent membership 
over time and when dealing with diverse disease incidents.  
The Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative (CWHC) was created through a memorandum 
of understanding between Canada’s five veterinary colleges and the British Columbia Animal 
Health Centre. CWHC’s mission is to “promote and protect the health of wildlife and Canadians 
through leadership, partnership, investigation and action” (Canadian Wildlife Health 
Cooperative, 2016b). With offices across the country and a headquarters at the Western 
Veterinary College at the University of Saskatchewan, CWHC has used their expertise to 
develop partnerships and collaborations on wildlife health issues in Canada. They conduct 
research and field surveillance to identify the emergence and mechanisms of disease and have 
become a key resource for governments developing wildlife management plans.  
The CWHC has taken on the role of secretariat for the wildlife health network, as its staff 
have expertise in wildlife management and experience in providing policy advice to decision 
makers. Under the leadership of Dr. Fredrick A. Leighton (now retired), the CWHC acted as the 
coordinating hub of the network, arranging teleconferences, funding agreements, workshops and 
authoring management plans in consultation with stakeholders inside and out of the network. An 
organization of this type is of particular value to a governance network working across 
jurisdictions. The CWHC has been seen as a neutral non-governmental agency that can be 
funded in order to support national work (Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative, 2016a). 
 The CWHC’s role as a broker and coordinator for national and region disease issues has 
resulted in staff from the organization forming the core of the network with a number of 
government officials who have been collaborating in varying capacities for many years. This 
core remains stable as the network addresses different disease management issues. Other 
participants will join the network for a shorter period due to their role or knowledge regarding a 
specific disease threat or species, rather than a broader focus on wildlife disease management. 
On the periphery of the network are other stakeholders who have limited interest or capacity to 
participate. These participants include environmental organizations and industry organizations 
(such as game farm associations).  
The individuals in the network work together to assess a disease threat and develop a 
management plan or other forms of policy response that can be implemented by various levels of 
government affected by the disease. Due to their reputations, their expertise and experience 
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dealing with wildlife health, as well as their willingness to tackle these cases, this network has 
been entrusted in both formal and informal capacities to provide advice, conduct active 
surveillance of animals at risk and to coordinate policy approaches to wildlife disease threats for 
government.  
1.2.1. Authority and Reporting Structure 
 
 In both cases explored in this thesis, the network began their work on an informal basis. 
Sharing information is a key function of the network and through that process emerging 
infectious diseases have been identified as significant threats in need of national or international 
management plans. In order to formalize their collaboration the network has drafted agreements 
to stipulate the scope of their authority to develop management plans for provinces and/or the 
federal government.  Figure 1-2 shows the formal authority structure for wildlife disease in 
Canada. 
As there is a division of authority between levels of government responsible for wildlife 
health, the network has sought approval for its plans from the Canadian Wildlife Directors 
Committee (CWDC). Members of this committee include directors of wildlife from each 
province and territory, as well as the director of the Canadian Wildlife Service (the agency 
responsible for wildlife within Environment Canada) and representatives from Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada and Parks Canada.  The CWDC exists to provide leadership on policy 
development and coordination across the country. 
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Figure 1-2: Authority structure for wildlife health in Canada 
 
The CWDC does not have power to authorize the implementation of wildlife health 
management plans; instead it sets direction and seeks to unify the goals of wildlife agencies 
across the country. The work of the network supports the CWDC’s mandate by both bringing 
emergent issues to the attention of the senior policy makers on the committee, as well as 
developing technical expertise required to fulfill the needs of wildlife agencies.  
Members of the network who are employed by provincial, territorial or federal 
government agencies or departments participate in the network as both individuals with expertise 
and representatives of their jurisdiction. Members are still responsible to their home department 
or agency and can use their position in government to advocate for the resources to implement 
specific management plans in their jurisdiction.  
As with any government policy or program, ultimate authority rests with provincial, 
territorial and federal ministers. The network is able to partially fund their activities through the 
CWHC’s operating funding, contributions from non-governmental organizations (like the 
environmental advocacy group Canadian Wildlife Federation) or contributions from provinces or 
the federal government. When the network’s goal is to fully implement a national management 
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plan aimed at mitigating a wildlife disease threat, an agreement from the Joint Ministers Council 
or the federal Cabinet is needed, as a significant financial commitment is required to ensure 
success. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
Studies of governance networks have generally taken one of two approaches: social 
network analysis or case studies. Depending on the nature of the research question, each of these 
approaches has both benefits and limitations for exploring governance networks.  
The apparent novelty of the network approach led social scientists to seek to identify the 
types of groups and individuals both inside and outside of the state involved in policy solutions. 
Using a form of mapping called social network analysis (SNA) allowed researchers to 
understand more fully how social and professional relationships connected groups that developed 
unprecedented policy solutions. Statistical models have been developed to measure the centrality 
of particular individuals or groups (known as ‘nodes’) in a social network given the number of 
connections they have. There are also measures to identify the density of the social network 
given the relative strength or weakness of the connection of nodes based on the instances of their 
interactions (Dowding, 1995).  
Ideally, transforming the ‘relational data’ of organizations into a graphical representation 
using SNA would reveal an underlying structure that illuminates how the network interacts. The 
results of social network analysis allows comparative and evaluative approaches to be used to 
assess the success of networks that were characterized by varying levels of density, reciprocity or 
the centrality of specific types of actors (DeLeon & Varda, 2009). 
The SNA approach brings to light the importance of structure and form in various types 
of network environments. However, on its own, the results of social network analyses are 
relatively incomplete. SNA produces a network map of participants but tells us nothing about the 
internal workings of the network: how power is distributed, how decisions are made or where the 
challenges lay. The outcomes of the analysis may overvalue the network structure at the expense 
of the processes of collaboration and network activities that are not examined through the 
mapping process. 
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The other limitation of SNA is that it typically shows the network at a single point in 
time, or assumes that the network does not change or evolve. Keith Dowding (1995) suggests 
that the transformation of relationships into units of power in a network model should not be 
overstated as these relationships are not static nor do they tell us much about the network’s 
behaviour. They only communicate the existence of the relations between nodes. As situations 
change and new issues are faced, the snapshot of the network may no longer be an accurate 
picture. Jenny M. Lewis (2011) argues that SNA did not find strong support in the policy world 
because the results are entirely too specific and tell us little about other policy sub-systems. 
The case study approach is the other commonly used methodology in studying 
governance networks. John Gerring (2004) describes this approach as “an intensive study of a 
single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (p.342). The case 
study method provides the opportunity to explore in depth the unit of analysis.  The aim of using 
the case study method is twofold: to identify the practices and history of the network that have 
led to its current outcomes as well as to extrapolate from the particularities of one network the 
subject area on a larger scale (Gerring, 2007). The value of a case is that we are presented with 
details on human behaviour from our subjects and their actions in enough detail that we can 
estimate how closely theoretical expectations match a real world example. Finding a connection 
between activities and behaviours occurring in the unit and those theorized in the literature can 
affirm expectations. However, if the case’s realities differ significantly from our expectations 
that also serves as an interesting outcome, as we can then explore where the theory ceases to 
account for real world behaviour. 
A case study is limited in its ability to permit broad inferences, inasmuch as any testable 
theories developed from empirical observations need to be examined in a larger sampling to be 
statistically significant. Gerring (2004) suggests that case studies allow for the identification of 
causal mechanisms that increase our understanding despite the statistical limitations; the 
researcher is able to use logic and the knowledge gained from an in-depth study to make a 
connection between a network, its context, its actions and its ability to sustain itself.  
 For the purposes of this thesis, I have chosen to use a case study approach to examine 
how the Canadian wildlife health network dealt with two instances of wildlife health crises. 
Developing an understanding of the structure of the network, akin to a rudimentary version of 
social network analysis, was an important jumping off point; however it was apparent early on 
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that simply mapping the relationships present in the network would not provide any new or 
previously unexplored information on governance networks. A more detailed analysis that delves 
into the network’s actions when facing disease threats was required to identify and expand upon 
an under theorized feature of governance networks, namely resilience.  Resilience is comprised 
of a number of practices as well as behavioural traits that in a network may not be present in 
uniformly making mapping an unsuitable method. 
1.3.1 Data Sources 
 
 A vast amount of case material on Chronic wasting disease and White nose syndrome 
was provided by the coordinating agency of the network, the Canadian Wildlife Health 
Cooperative (CWHC), including drafts of management plans, financial documents, minutes of 
network meetings, correspondence between network members and an email archive from Dr. 
Fredrick A. Leighton, the former Executive Director of CWHC. This information was 
supplemented by public documents such as research reports and press releases from governments 
and academic studies on management strategies and treatment options for the two diseases. Dr. 
Leighton was also able to fill in the gaps through personal interviews and communications when 
necessary.  
 After an initial examination of the case material, the research question began to emerge 
more fully. There were gaps in the network’s activity on Chronic wasting disease (CWD) due 
primarily to a change in the political makeup of the federal government in 2006. The work on 
White Nose Syndrome started later,  in late 2010, but the network had to work within the same 
political environment and was able to navigate roadblocks it had not surpasses in the CWD case. 
To appreciate the differences between the two cases I decided to adapt a model of organizational 
resilience, developed in the literature on positive organizational scholarship, to the phenomenon 
of network governance. Resilience recommended itself because the complex policy problems the 
network deals with do not lend themselves to easy or quick solutions. The work of the network 
appeared from the outset to be a struggle for answers, responses and resources. Resilience and 
the capacity to continue working in the face of these struggles appeared to be a fruitful avenue of 
inquiry. 
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 Secondary sources contain little material that directly address governance network 
resilience, outside of case studies on disaster management networks operating in post-Hurricane 
Katrina in Louisiana in 2005 and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Positive organizational 
scholarship literature presented the concept of resilience as the ability to adapt and make positive 
adjustments in the face of internal and external pressures (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). This 
provided a useful explanatory tool that seemed as though it could be tested against the findings 
of the case studies I had already examined. The wildlife health network had made significant 
inroads into becoming an authority on wildlife health epidemics in Canada without any formal 
authority. The question of how such a network maintains its activities despite limited funding 
and political power was of key interest to me. 
 Using the case study method I was able to delve deeply into the attitudes, behaviours and 
actions of the network members by examining their correspondence with each other, government 
officials, their U.S. counterparts and members of non-governmental organizations they 
occasionally work with. I was able to ensure that features of the resilience model that I judged to 
be present, such as failure-seeking behaviour or deference to expertise (see Chapter 3 and 
passim), were present in multiple instances. Language used in correspondence between network 
members was also present in network authored management plans and/or meeting minutes. 
These patterns allowed me to be relatively certain that the attitudes or behaviours I observed 
were not subjective assumptions on my part, but rather consistently observed themes. Whenever 
possible I have cited a publicly available document that contains the same language or action that 
I observed in unpublished material. 
 The next chapter will present an overview of the relevant research on governance 
networks, the following on resilience and the governance network resilience model. Chapters 
four and five contain the narrative of each of the cases reconstructed from my research on the 
network’s activities. Each case is then evaluated against criteria laid out in the governance 
network resilience model. The thesis concludes with a brief discussion of my findings. 
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CHAPTER 2: NETWORKS 
2.1 The Concept 
 
The ‘network’ concept has captured the imagination of theorists across disciplines. What 
is it about this model that makes it so useful for understanding social, technical and biological 
systems? Guido Caldarelli and Michele Catazaro (2012) suggest that the network concept allows 
us to make sense of the seeming randomness and disorder that appears on the surface of complex 
systems.  When we search through a seemingly random or disordered grouping of complex 
elements there is often an underlying network structure that illuminates the behaviour of the 
larger group (or network). Unpredictable or unexpected phenomena or behaviour in a system can 
also often be attributed to the underlying network and the interaction of network elements. In 
both created and natural systems, there is self-organization that has occurred as the outcome of 
relationships, mechanisms and tendencies iterated along thousands of interactions.
 
 This self-
organization is fundamental to network governance and represents the most conspicuous 
difference between a network and various forms of hierarchy.  
The key to the network concept, in Caldarelli and Catazaro’s estimation, is that a network 
is more than just the sum of the individual elements that comprise the network. A network 
should be thought of as the product of three components: the individual elements (i.e. people, 
organizations, parts of an ecosystem), the sum of all these individual elements and, most 
importantly, the kinetic interactions in the relationships among the different elements (Caldarelli 
& Catazaro, 2012, p. 4).  In a governance network we can see this interaction at play in complex 
policy problems such as a public health epidemic or the aftermath of a nature disaster. The 
collective knowledge, skill and resources of participant governments, NGOs and individuals 
could result in ‘enough’ to solve the problem; however, no one participant has the means and 
knowledge to implement a solution on their own. It is the collective and collaborative response 
that can, theoretically, ultimately provide the best course of action to implement a solution. 
Another reason the network concept has captured the imagination of many researchers is 
that network structures emerge partially through an element of randomness and chance that is 
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unlike many purpose-created structures and institutions. Isolated elements are transformed 
through a pattern of interactions into groups and communities. Network structures appear not as 
grids but as webs of relationships as a result of the presence of some disorder. Mark 
Granovetter’s (1983) work on information diffusion and communication across networks points 
to the presence of network hubs that connect unexpected elements to create the ‘small world’ of 
a network.
 
 Individuals or organizations acting as hubs span group boundaries and connect 
individuals and groups that would most likely never interact otherwise (Berry et al., 2004).  
The Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative (CWHC) can be thought of as a hub for the 
wildlife health network, as the knowledge and experience of its staff gives it standing with a 
variety of organizations, individuals and governments that would never have been connected 
otherwise. This bridging role allows for a variety of perspectives, experiences and frames of 
reference to be present in the development of management plans or policy responses in a way 
that is not possible in traditional governance models. Provan and Kenis (2007) frame the role 
played by organizations like the CWHC as ‘Lead Organization-Governed Networks’. The 
knowledge, experience and connections that provide the authority to be a ‘hub’ is conceived of 
as legitimacy to broker relationships and perform a coordinating function for a network. Provan 
and Kenis (2007, p. 237) suggest that decreasing levels of trust and goal consensus due to greater 
numbers of participants (particularly participants who do not have a history working together) 
will require more brokered forms of governance for effective network interactions. 
2.2. Governance networks  
 
Networks in government are a form of social coordination that attempts to address 
government and market failures that have emerged as well as tackle seemingly new, complex 
problems that require a collaborative, multi-level response from government and civil society 
(Bell & Hindmoor, 2012). In its basic form networks in government are comprised of individuals 
and organizations from civil society (such as non-governmental organizations, universities and 
interested citizens), various levels of government and the private sector that collaboratively co-
produce policy solutions, knowledge and/or program adjustments in a given policy sphere. These 
groups vary in their membership, their administrative structure and activities but are generally 
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organized in a collaborative structure, with a horizontal power distribution and non-mandatory 
participation.  
Early work on networks identified three broad forms. The first was the policy network 
(also known as an issue network or policy community) which identified a coalition of interested 
parties that together affect the agenda of government and the legislative process (Atkinson & 
Coleman, 1989; Wilkinson, Lowe & Donaldson, 2010). The second was the intergovernmental 
network, which attempt to coordinate government action and response between central and local 
governments (in unitary systems) and between national, provincial/state and local governments 
(in federal systems) (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). The third network type is the public management 
or governance network. The governance network is a group of individuals and organizations 
(including government) who are attempting to solve policy problems from inception to 
implementation that can not be adequately addressed by a single party. Robert Agranoff (2006) 
suggests the term ‘collaborative management’ for these activities and describe it as follows: “the 
process of facilitating and operating in multi organizational arrangements to solve problems that 
cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations” (p. 1). 
Governance networks, the network form of key interest in this thesis, have been in 
existence in various forms most likely as long as there has been government (Goldsmith & 
Eggers, 2004). In the past 30 years, the use and study of governance networks has expanded 
significantly. The overarching reason for this interest and expansion is that traditional 
governance centred on the instruments of the modern state has struggled to keep pace with 
emergent public problems. The solutions needed to address economic, social and environmental 
problems facing citizens and communities require coordination beyond the capacity of discrete 
units of government at the municipal, provincial and federal levels. 
The development of governance since the 19
th
 century has primarily focused on the 
creation of stable institutions that provide a model for consistent legislative and public 
administration outcomes through a democratically-elected officials and an independent public 
service. Stephen Goldsmith and William D. Eggers (2004) suggest that this traditional 
organizational thinking cannot cope with the realities of what bureaucrats are required to do to 
provide solutions through policies and programs: “rigid bureaucratic systems that operate with 
command-and-control procedures, narrow work restrictions, and inward-looking cultures and 
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operational models are particularly ill-suited to addressing problems that often transcend 
organizational boundaries” (p. 7). 
The ideal governance arrangement in the Westminster tradition has at its core a civil 
service that is strictly divided along department lines, is separated from overt political 
interference and has a vertical hierarchical structure for both control and accountability. 
Departments and agencies report ultimately to their Minister who is accountable in Parliament to 
the citizenry. It is difficult to assimilate networks into this formula, with the result that, as Kettl 
(2002) argues, public administration theory has remained static in the face of  complex problems 
spanning policy areas and geographic boundaries as well as increased demands on the 
bureaucracy. As a result, practitioners of government and governance have been obliged to fend 
for themselves both practically and theoretically as they develop collaborative  methods to solve 
problems. 
The separation between theory and practice is not only an issue for practitioners in 
government and academia but has also nurtured a distrust and scepticism both inside and outside 
of government institutions. The growth of services provided, contracted out or collaborated on 
by government has challenged the traditional convention of ministerial oversight, which cannot 
be readily stretched to accommodate these different organizational forms. It is unreasonable to 
assume that the minister of a modern government department can be made aware of the details of 
all the programs under her remit and that leaves gaps in accountability (Roy, 2008). Beyond 
ministerial oversight, there are also challenges in communication and coordination between 
government departments that share or overlap on areas of responsibility but have to rely on 
formal methods of reporting through a chain of authority. 
An illustration of the potential for failure of this governance structure, with its strict 
division by department and jurisdiction, its absence of day-to-day contact with ministers and its 
vulnerability to miscommunication, is the case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in 
the United Kingdom. The BSE crisis spanned a decade from mid-1980s to mid-1990s and saw 
thousands of animals destroyed, millions of dollars lost to the UK’s economy and most 
significantly dozens of lives lost to the human variant of the fatal neurodegenerative disorder.   
The BSE Inquiry, commissioned by the UK Parliament in the wake of the crisis, found 
that it took two years for the initial discovery of the disease in livestock by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) to be disclosed to the Department of Health (DH). They 
 18 
 
also suggested that had the departmental divide between MAFF and DH not been so great, action 
would have occurred months before it ultimately did (Gerodimos, 2004). The Inquiry revealed 
that the decision by MAFF public servants to downplay the threat posed by BSE was influenced 
heavily by a desire to calm public fears and appease their professional connections in the beef 
industry (Gerodimos, 2004, p. 918). The decisions made at MAFF appear to be entirely devoid 
of a concern for the broader impact of BSE and shows a worst-case scenario for silo thinking on 
the part of government departments reacting to crisis situations. 
The inability of governments to adequately address complex public policy problems is 
not just a problem of institutional structure but is also due to the increasing speed at which new 
problems are emerging. Traditional governance is based on a series of institutions embedded in 
the stability of legislative and administrative procedure.  The new problems faced by society and 
government are different in kind and complexity than the problems that confronted the relatively 
stable institutions of the 19th century (Jones et al., 2008). The appearances of new diseases, 
record population growth, devastating natural disasters, among other problems challenge the 
most knowledgeable public servants, academics and legislators.  
The SARS coronavirus is the textbook example of an epidemic for the modern world. 
From its origin in Guangdong Province, China in 2002 the virus spread to 37 countries in less 
than a year, killing almost 500 people (Smith, 2006). While the outcome could have been much 
more severe, the economic impacts and loss of lives illustrates how an interconnected world has 
set the stage for unprecedented policy problems. The development of new treatments and 
approaches to tackle these diseases and the environmental processes encouraging them is 
essential. Rethinking how governments tackle crisis scenarios and mitigate high risk situations is 
also critical to preventing the loss of human and animal lives as well as environmental and 
economic damage.   
The governance network approach can be seen in this light as a redress of the structural 
problems in traditional governance as well as a coping mechanism to deal with unprecedented 
and complex problems. The lack of capacity of government to properly address policy problems 
was one of the catalysts of the development of the governance network model (Isett, Mergel,  
LeRoux, Mischen, & Rethemeyer, 2011). Bell and Hindmoor (2012) argue that networks were 
the natural response to the acknowledgment that government is no longer in a position to act 
unilaterally to achieve policy solutions, while Donald Kettl (2002) suggests that responsibility 
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must be shared as no one government or organization “can completely encompass, manage, or 
control any problem that really matters” (p. 6). 
2.3 How do governance networks address the failings of traditional governance?  
 
Donald Kettl (2002) argues that the network approach is a mechanism that enables 
governments to bridge their traditional forms of governance with the realities of the ‘knowledge-
driven information society’ as governance networks are driven by situation and need as opposed 
to hierarchy and legislative procedure. Jenny M. Lewis (2011) summarizes the use of governance 
networks as a changed relationship between society and state: 
In short, network governance rests on a recognition that policy is the result of governing  
processes that are not fully controlled by governments. Policy-making occurs through  
interactive forms of governing that involve many actors from different spheres. It relies on 
negotiation between various actors whose interactions give rise to a relatively stable pattern of 
policy-making that constitutes a mode of coordination... A form of governance that rests on 
interpendency [sic], negotiation and trust is required to cope with changes in how governments 
and societies interact. (p.122) 
 
This transition in thinking from a bureaucratic silo to a collaborative relationship 
provides the opportunity to overcome the lack of communication between various departments or 
levels of government that is often at play in crisis scenarios (like the BSE situation in the UK). A 
governance network also requires that stakeholders participate in collaborative decision making, 
which suggests that a broader scope of interests can be taken into account. Robert Agranoff’s 
(2006) work on interorganizational governance networks found that the concept of decision 
making is often replaced by ‘reaching an agreement’. As it is unlikely any one element of the 
network would have the financial or legal resources to contend with a problem on its own, 
authority is shared and there are partnerships in lieu of lines of authority. ‘Reaching an 
agreement’ then becomes an opportunity for mutual learning, as the process of collaboration 
requires understanding varying viewpoints and sharing of knowledge: “joint learning that leads 
to brokered consensus” (Agranoff, 2006, p. 60). 
 The collaborative problem solving seen in governance networks also allows governments 
to access crucial knowledge and communicate it as part of the problem solving activities seen in 
many governance networks. One activity that is vital for networks - particularly those addressing 
problems that are new, complex or full of uncertainty - is knowledge management. Policy 
problems with newly emerged or uncertain elements require new knowledge and new answers. 
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Agranoff (2006) suggests that knowledge is a commodity to be sought out and managed in the 
network world. Networks that wrestle with problems that contain layers of complexity and 
uncertainty across jurisdictional boundaries have to develop and manage distributed knowledge 
systems, as the expertise and knowledge to solve problems seldom rests with one organization.  
The practice of knowledge management is to join both the explicit and implicit 
knowledge of the policy problem together and communicate it to the broader network for the 
purposes of engaging in an informed collaborative problem solving process (Agranoff, 2006). A 
successful collaborative problem solving process requires broadening the horizontal relationships 
inside and outside of government. Among the key benefits is the (often temporary) destruction of 
the departmental silo and the communication barrier between portfolios, as long as all sides can 
engage as active and willing participants. Engaging in a governance network requires an 
acknowledgement of the complexity of the policy problems because a network must seek to find 
a substantive solution, not a simple solution that only satisfies one stakeholder. Mark Imperial’s 
(2005) work on watershed management networks shows that collaborative activities were 
beneficial to network members from varying sectors and political positions. The opportunities to 
work in a collaborative capacity “are important because they help network members find ways to 
work together, generate new ideas, share knowledge, solve problems, build relationships, and 
develop trust’’ (p. 296). 
2.4 Governance network limitations 
 
Governance networks are not a panacea for all policy problems, nor are they the sole 
mechanism for collaboration within the policy sphere. Collaboration can take a variety of forms 
including formal funding agreements, multilevel projects, contracts and the creation of 
interagency organizations. Both bureaucratic institutions and governance networks use many of 
these arrangements in their work when formal mechanisms of accountability are required. In 
fact, the increase of these types of arrangements seems to be normalizing collaboration in 
bureaucratic government organizations (Agranoff, 2006).  
 A chief criticism of governance networks has been the lack of democratic 
accountability in networks and network arrangements (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007; Sørensen, 
2002). Sørensen and Torfing (2005) suggest that proponents of governance networks have often 
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failed to focus on the democratic implications of the ‘de-governmentalized’ state. The inclusion 
of non-state actors in the policy arena is not novel by any means, however, the potential 
devolution of authority to governance networks that have closed membership raises concerns 
about the democratic accountability of decision making that affects the public or the 
government’s resources. 
Differing arguments have surfaced to address these apparent accountability deficiencies. 
The role of expertise as a form of legitimacy, the inclusion of ‘low politics’ and the use of 
metagovernance are discussed below as methods to bridge the accountability gap. In a discussion 
of highly technical and complex areas of service provision, for example energy regulation in the 
European Union, Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2011) argue that governments do not have the 
knowledge or capacity required to have proper oversight. They suggest that networks comprised 
of technical experts are better equipped to act for the good of the citizenry and the energy sector, 
as their distance from government and knowledge of the subject area lends legitimacy and 
credibility. A formal mechanism of democratic oversight for technical experts is recommended 
to ensure public interest is maintained (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2011). This perspective suggests 
that subject matter experts can contribute to the creation of legitimacy for the governance 
network. 
While examining community environmental projects in the Netherlands, Thomas Hahn 
(2011) expands the notion of democratic accountability beyond the traditional realm of ‘high’ 
democracy. Hahn suggests that the inclusion of individuals and groups who have traditionally 
been excluded from policy decisions complements representative democracy. These participants 
have limited access to lawmakers and through collaboration in the network environment, ‘low’ 
democracy is in action through deliberative discussion and problem solving. Hahn (2011) argues 
that ‘low’ democracy is not a replacement for traditional representative democracy but rather 
supports it to increase the legitimacy of the decisions made in consultation with environmental 
networks. As each network was ‘nested’ within the larger context of traditional bureaucratic and 
democratic decision making, the networks were able to maintain their flexibility and adaptability 
while having traditional democratic accountability through elected officials. 
Hahn’s concept of nested governance networks supports Sørensen and Torfing’s (2005) 
concept of ensuring that governance networks are themselves democratic through meta-
governance. “Meta-governance designates the endeavour to regulate self-regulating governance 
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networks by shaping the conditions under which they operate. It involves the attempts of 
politicians, administrators or other governance networks to construct, structure and influence the 
game-like interaction within particular governance networks” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005, p. 
202). Meta-governance can take the form of shaping the membership, scope, power and 
reporting requirements of the network.  These authors all suggest that governance networks 
require increased democratic accountability to ensure that the decisions they are making 
legitimate and responsible decisions. 
There are a number of fronts on which governance networks can potentially improve or 
hinder policy outcomes. In order to maintain a sense of proportion about the value and potential 
of governance networks, evaluative tools need to be developed to understand the full impact of 
the interactions and contributions made by governance networks to the policy making process 
and policy outcomes.  
2.5 Evaluating governance networks 
 
Being able to accurately assess the outcomes produced by governance networks has been 
a challenge for academics and practitioners. As governance networks often seek to address 
complex or multifaceted policy problems, these types of problems that do not have 
straightforward or easily achieved solutions, evaluative tools that can appropriately assess the 
network’s impact are of key interest.  
The question of how to evaluate governance network performance or effectiveness has 
been addressed in a number of ways. One school of thought suggests that governance networks 
should be evaluated like their component parts (organizations) adapting to the network 
environment by multiplying the number of stakeholder communities the network is attempting to 
satisfy (Provan & Milward, 2001). This involves measuring network outcomes at three levels: 
network-wide, community and participant organizations. A second school of thought suggests 
that ex ante goals and standards are detrimental to achieving the necessary exploration, learning 
and innovation that is required to successfully address complex policy problems. The model 
attempts to resolve this problem by using ex post goals and measurements to determine how 
successfully the solutions relate to objectives and whether there is a net improvement from the 
perspective of all participants (Koppenjan, 2008).  
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A third school of thought argues that outcomes themselves are entirely too limiting for 
measuring the success of a governance network. Complex policy problems will often take years 
to be resolved, which is problematic for governments that are focused on shorter-term progress 
to secure elections and to respond to opposition. Brian W. Head (2008), among others, suggests 
that the tendency to mitigate the complexity of evaluation in these situations leads to assessing 
outputs rather than outcomes, which is problematic. Head’s suggestion is to instead assess the 
processes of collaboration (as the success of the network is vital to the success of the policy 
solutions it is implementing) as well as the outcomes produced by the network and ultimately 
address whether the collaboration is adding-value (2008, p. 741). While the approach 
acknowledges the complexity of certain problems governance networks engage with, this is also 
a limited approach, as the success of the collaboration may not translate to successful policy 
action. 
2.5.1 Network failure 
 
From that brief examination, it is apparently that evaluation is a challenging issue and the 
concept of successful governance networks is often problematic. The other side of network 
evaluation and effectiveness is the development of a theory of network failure. This approach 
seeks to develop a theory similar to the concepts of market failure and organizational failure that 
address the social conditions that lead to network failure. Shrank and Whitford (2011) suggest 
that network failures are caused by either environmental factors, like transactional uncertainty or 
participant limitations, such as the limits imposed by bounded rationality and individual or 
organizational opportunism. The two forms of ‘absolute’ network failure take the form of 
network devolution (the collapse of an existing network relationship) and the nonappearance of a 
potentially useful network. The two forms of ‘relative’ failure are due to lack of competence (an 
underdeveloped network) and opportunism (a contested network). In other words, relative failure 
occurs when problematic networks continue to exist and absolute failure occurs when a network 
ceases existing or does not come into being. 
 Shrank and Whitford’s theory of network failure identifies a gap in the governance 
network literature that requires further exploration. An exploration of which features have led to 
failure and which features have assisted networks in avoiding failure would provide a valuable 
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resource to understand how to mitigate failure. Literature of this nature has focused primarily on 
how structural features of networks (such as centrality of relationships or the presence of 
coordinating agencies) improve outcomes (Provan & Milward, 2001; Isett, et al., 2011). What 
has been neglected is how a network’s actions are affected by financial, informational and 
organizational barriers and how networks cope when faced with barriers to their objectives. 
When a network has formed in an effort to address a policy problem, like an emerging wildlife 
health epidemic, which has no viable treatment options, the ability to continue operating by 
cultivating and maintaining a resilient network is essential. 
2.6 Improving network activities 
 
A perspective that focuses on strengthening the positive assets present in the wildlife 
health network is needed. Identifying the benefits of the governance network form and the skills 
of the network’s members that can contribute to improving outcomes finds it grounding in a 
form of organizational theory that derived from positive psychology.  
Positive psychology as a field of study was introduced by Martin Seligman as an attempt 
to balance psychology’s focus on pathology and behavioural traits that led to negative outcomes 
(Kelloway, 2011). Seligman’s desire to identify positive attitudes and actions that enhance 
mental well-being and relationships was adapted to organizations and organizational behaviour 
by Fred Luthans. The resulting field of positive organizational behaviour (sometimes referred to 
as positive organizational scholarship), was defined by Luthans (2002) as “the study and 
application of positively oriented human resource strengths and psychological capacities that can 
be measured, developed, and effectively managed for performance improvement in today’s 
workplace” (p. 59). Traditional organizational behaviour seeks to understand the motivating 
factors of employee behaviour, whereas positive organizational behaviour focuses primarily on 
psychology traits that engender positive attitudes and seeks to operationalize these traits 
(Kelloway, 2011). The psychological traits identified as important for development and/or 
management to improve performance include hope, optimism, resiliency and efficacy (Norman, 
Luthans & Luthans, 2005).  
 This chapter has outlined policy problems that have spurred changes in governance 
mechanisms from traditional government institutions towards governance networks. Governance 
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networks provide opportunities to address policy problems that span across jurisdictions. They 
are theorized to provide policy solutions developed in a collaborative capacity such that the 
structural disadvantages of traditional governance arrangements can be minimized. Theoretical 
work on governance network evaluation has provided a variety of frameworks for evaluating 
success but is limited in how it has conceptualized failure and the mitigation of failure. One 
approach developed in positive organizational scholarship has been to identify and strengthen 
processes that promote resilience in organizations in order to reduce failure when a network is 
faced with threats and adversity.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESILIENCE AND A NETWORK RESILIENCE MODEL 
 
The concept of resilience initially emerged from material and engineering sciences where 
it was used to denote the ability of a substance to regain its original properties and form after 
undergoing stress. This concept finds practical purposes in the natural and mechanical sciences 
but it is also an elegant linguistic metaphor that has captured the imagination of social scientists. 
A variety of understandings and definitions of resilience have emerged. The ability to withstand 
damage, as in a military situation, where resilience emerges from a redundancy in staff and 
equipment is a common understanding.  Resilience can also be thought of as system adaptation, 
where a network or organization maintains the ability to adapt to changing circumstances 
through iterative adaptations. A return to the status quo or the ability to withstand exogenous or 
endogenous shocks and return to ‘normal’ such as in an economic system post-financial crash is 
also a potential interpretation of the term (Scheinert & Comfort, 2014). 
 The definition of resilience most appropriate for my purposes comes from positive 
organizational scholarship where organizational resilience is defined as “maintenance of positive 
adjustment under challenging conditions” (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003, p. 95). This definition is 
similar to system adaptation and acknowledges that resilience is more akin to a process than a 
stable state or binary concept.  
Organizational resilience arose as a topic of study as a reaction to the common assertion 
that a process called ‘threat-rigidity’ is the chief response of organizations to emerging threats. 
Threat-rigidity is a process wherein significant stress in an organization results in a series of 
deterministic responses including narrowing of cognitive processes, centralization of control and 
resource conservation. This type of behaviour in the face of threats can be problematic as threat-
rigidity suggests that an individual or an organization while under heightened stress loses the 
capacity to consider all possible solutions and retains only the capacity to rely on prior 
knowledge regardless of its applicability to the current situation (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). 
Threat-rigidity results in organizations that fail to explore options; rather they concentrate 
decision making and limit the output of resources. Organizations that become rigid in the face of 
threats may survive, but the inference is that the adaptation is not a value or recognized quality in 
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the organization as the pressure for adjustment (the threat) is exogenous. Organizational 
resilience as both a topic of study and an approach to leadership in organizations implies that it is 
possible to broaden the knowledge base and the skill set of members of the organization in order 
to limit rigid or automatic behaviours when facing challenges or stressors. 
3.1 Resilience as Positive Adjustment 
 
 The concept of resilience as positive adjustment under challenging conditions originated 
in child psychology where the processes and mechanisms of resilience have been studied in 
individuals who have dealt with both severe trauma and ongoing stress. Resilience has been 
theorized as being the result of a number of cognitive and physiological functions, including both 
inherent characteristics and learned traits (Dongxia & Kan, 2011).  According to Sutcliffe and 
Vogus (2003), psychological resilience is now widely (but not wholly) accepted as a dynamic 
process, rather than the product of inherent biological characteristics. They portray resilience as a 
self-reinforcing process: 
Resilience from a developmental perspective does not merely emerge in response to specific 
interruptions or jolts, but rather develops over time from continually handling risks, stresses, 
and strains. Positively adjusting in the face of challenging conditions is thought to add both to 
the strength of the current entity and also to the strength of the future entity, in that resilience 
is the continuing ability to use internal and external resources successfully to resolve issues… 
What this means is that early experience shapes later experience such that the way in which 
an entity (i.e., organization, unit, individual) interprets and responds to new challenges 
depends on attitudes, expectations, feelings, and response possibilities derived from a history 
of prior experience (e.g., adaptation). (p. 98-99) 
 
Conceptualizing resilience as the ability to make positive adjustments, as the result of 
learning, coping and integrating experiences into a skill set suggests that resilience is not a binary 
state, it is developed over time. There are two potential responses to a threat: either a defense 
mechanism is thrown up when a threat is unknown, or accommodative and assimilative 
processes emerge if a threat is recognized as a stressor. The former response can be thought of as 
a response of threat-rigidity, where an individual or organization reverts to its most basic nature 
of fight or flight (reacting in a subconscious manner). The latter response can be seen as a 
resilient response where the subject pulls from past experience, education or other resources to 
either reassess their own actions or goals to counter the threat or minimize the impact the threat 
has on their life or organization (Dongxia & Kan, 2011).  
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 In order to have the capacity to develop resilient behaviours and make productive choices 
to reduce threats or risk, rather than deferring to passive defense mechanisms, there are certain 
necessities. Individuals require an adequate level of physical, mental and material resources (or 
security) as well as suitable levels of cognitive competence that would engage functions like self-
regulation, problem solving, planning and working memory for appropriate adaptive behaviour 
(Masten, 2011).  
Developmental psychologists have attempted to develop a scalable model of resilience 
that can be applied broadly, be it to children, ecological environments, organizations or large 
scale populations, in an effort to find ways to promote resilience. Measuring resilience capacity 
relies on judging the total risk or adversity facing the subject versus total assets the subject has in 
their metaphorical cognitive, physical and material toolbox. When looking at the factors that 
influence outcomes in children, a typical risk may be a low socioeconomic status, a single parent 
household or a learning disability. The presence of resources that could help mitigate the risk 
would include intervention from therapists, educational assistance, food security, or the 
proximity of a supportive extended family. Acquiring the necessary levels of cognitive 
competence is a particular challenge for children, as they are in the developmental stage; the 
literature cites effective parenting as the key protective factor for resiliency over threats (Masten, 
2011, p. 498). The interplay of these risks and assets create a variety of educational and 
behavioural outcomes: where a child with a developmental disability may thrive because of the 
opportunities provided in a high socioeconomic upbringing, while a child with average 
intelligence in a low socioeconomic household may lack the ability to cope. These differences 
can be traced to chronic poverty, which leads to absentee parenting, which deprives the child of 
functional role models and emotional support, undermining overall competence. 
3.2 Governance network resilience  
 
As much as resilience may be a valuable psychological quality, is it equally valuable for 
organizations and networks? Organizational resilience emerges as a subject of interest from a 
desire to understand why some firms fail and other adjust rapidly and successfully to threats 
(Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). Can the concept of resilience be used to evaluate networks as 
effectively as it has been used to evaluate organizations? 
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Traditional bureaucracies have sufficient legal standing and stability to infer that they 
will exist over time; non-governmental organizations often exist on less solid ground but none 
the less have legal standing and support year after year in part because individuals carry their 
knowledge and experience with them. Networks, however, exist as relationships between these 
groups, often with little certainty regarding their continuity, save for a short term government 
contract or an ongoing desire on the part of members to participate in problem solving. The 
network flourishes often because this lack of structural arrangements provides the flexibility 
needed to tackle problems in a way that governments cannot. If we accept that networks like the 
wildlife health network in Canada are tackling problems that cannot be successfully addressed by 
traditional means, and if governments are willing to invest in partnerships or financial 
commitments to networks: it stands to reason that we should concern ourselves with both if and 
how networks are able to be resilient in the face of the uncertainty of their ongoing existence.  
 In developing a model to explore the way resilience aids the ongoing work of the wildlife 
health network, it is valuable to explore how organizational resilience scholars operationalize 
beliefs, processes and actions to identify resilience. The organizational resilience literature 
contains a consensus regarding how resilient organizations think, act and organize. Resilient 
organizations are successful, forward-looking, sceptical and have proactive organizational 
culture (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003, p. 106).
 
Resilient organizations enlarge information inputs, 
loosening control and reconfiguring resources when facing threats; all of which results in a 
positive feedback loop into that strengthens organizational capabilities, essentially the opposite 
of threat-rigidity (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
 Based on the organizational resilience literature, I have adapted a number of qualities, 
behaviours and beliefs into a model that will be used to assess the resilience of the wildlife health 
network in Canada for two cases. The three features of resiliency that are applicable to the 
network environment are: slack in resources; adaptive capacity; and situation awareness. These 
features will each be set out in terms of their relationship to resilience, followed by an 
exploration of how they will be identified in the case studies (see Table 3-1). 
3.2.1 Slack in Resources 
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The concept of organizational slack emerged from Herbert Simon’s assertion that firms 
often do not seek to completely maximize their profits through optimal efficiency. The excess 
amount paid to individuals, above what was strictly necessary to maintain their participation in 
the organization, was seen as slack (Bourgeois, 1981). His colleagues, James March and Richard 
Cyert further developed the concept of slack, arguing that slack was not simply an inefficiency 
but rather spare resources that are necessary to maintain organizational flexibility (Cyert & 
March, 1992). Bourgeois (1981) suggests that organizational slack is a means of safeguarding 
actual or potential resources which serves to protect the organization when it faces internal or 
external pressures for change. It also allows breathing room when the organization seeks to make 
strategic changes of its own volition.  
For the purposes of the network resilience model, slack in resources comes in three broad 
categories: financial, social and cognitive. Financial resources are obviously an important feature 
of the capacity of any government, organization or network to function effectively. As in Cyert 
and March’s conception of organizational slack, the presence of enough financial resources to 
make strategic changes or to respond to external pressures is crucial. In the case of the wildlife 
disease network, a minimum set of financial resources is required to detect a wildlife disease in a 
new province and to subsequently deploy surveillance or engage wildlife veterinarians in a 
treatment program. Cognitive resources, such as the ability to gain additional knowledge when 
facing a new threat or problem, and social resources, like additional contacts with industry, 
academia, non-governmental organizations or government, are also relevant to understanding 
levels of resiliency.  
The research done by Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) indicates that the timely deployment of 
the various resources can make the difference between resilience and rigidity, as organizations 
with greater resilience are willing and able to expend resources to tackle emerging threats.  
Along with the willingness to expend resources at crucial times comes the need to have them in 
the bank. Organizations and networks cannot be perpetually overdrawn. Slack in resources, 
which means having an adequate margin, is necessary in order to reconfigure resources and draw 
on them when unexpected issues arise.  
Evidence of slack in resources in the wildlife health case studies will come from an 
examination of the financial arrangements, to determine if the network is overstretched 
financially, as well as an assessment of whether the network can access social and cognitive 
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resources when stresses occur. In particular, we will identify the presence of slack in financial 
resources by whether or not the network members plan for contingency funds, if they are able to 
access additional finances through recombination or the formation of new partnerships and if 
there are latent financial resources available. Cognitive slack will be identified by the ability of 
the network to access new information and perspectives for problem solving (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 
2003). Relational slack will be identified by evidence of support from political decision makers 
and authorities (who were not previously active in the case) and the participation of new network 
members as a suggestion that the network is not overstretched in terms of human resources. 
3.2.2 Adaptive Capacity 
 
The second feature of the model is adaptive capacity. The importance of adaptability in 
an individual’s psychological processes, as we have seen, is the difference between throwing up 
defense mechanisms and being able to cope. Organizations and networks that display adaptive 
capacity are in a stronger position to cope with uncertainty and stresses if they are able to adjust 
their behaviours and practices to meet new challenges. McManus, Seville, Vargo, & Brunsdon 
(2008) suggest that adaptive capacity is “the ability of an enterprise to alter its strategy, 
operations, management systems, governance structure, and decision-support capabilities to 
withstand perturbations and disruptions” (p. 86).  
Adaptive capacity allows the network to adjust its approach to policy implementation, 
knowledge acquisition, resource management or any number of fundamental activities in a 
timely manner so that their work is still relevant and their actions are still in line with their 
objectives. The literature suggests that adaptive capacity is the result of the dynamics and culture 
of an organization or network that allow it to make decisions in a timely and appropriate manner.  
It is a function of a flexible organizational culture, receptive leadership, timely information 
gathering and sharing, as well as an ongoing belief that the group can deal with stressors and 
grow to meet challenges (McManus et al., 2008).  
Evidence of adaptive capacity will come from examining the network’s attempts at 
altering strategy and operations, embracing new information and effectively communicating with 
network partners when potential stressors occur. The perspective of network members will be 
explored with regard to their views of crises. The literature suggests both an opportunistic and 
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positive disposition is valuable to tackling problems. Increased communication and information 
inputs when problems occur will suggest adaptive capacity, as will the loosening of decision 
making control and attempts to solve problems using an “organic and innovative approach” 
(McManus et al., 2008, p. 84). The opposite approach—deferring to authority within a command 
and control structure—will suggest a lack of adaptive capacity, as McManus et al. suggest 
command and control management relies on automation and rigor which in turn reduce positive 
performance and situation awareness in a crisis or ‘out of the ordinary’ situation. 
3.2.3 Situation Awareness 
 
 The final feature of the model is situation awareness which is defined as the organization 
(or network)’s awareness of its operating context, by identifying potential threats and 
opportunities and their consequences. Situation awareness also includes knowledge of the needs, 
expectations and limitations of stakeholders; of the ramification of potential actions; of potential 
triggers for stressors and of organizational operating requirements (McManus et al., 2008). 
Discussing a similar concept termed ‘mindful organizing’, Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) suggest a 
number of related beliefs and actions that drive the type of self-awareness and proactive planning 
resilient organizations require:  
 engaging in proactive and preemptive analysis of possible vulnerabilities (preoccupation  
with failure), questioning assumptions and received wisdom to create a more complete  
picture (reluctance to simplify interpretations), discussing the human and organizational 
capabilities that enable safe performance (sensitivity to operations), attempting to 
collectively learn from errors that have occurred (commitment to resilience), migrating 
decisions to the person or people with the greatest expertise with the problem at hand 
regardless of rank (deference to expertise). (p. 3420) 
 
Evidence of situation awareness in this analysis will come from the network’s members’ 
communication and coordination with regard to potential problems, capacity building, and 
stakeholder expectations. If the network is blindsided by stakeholder activities, this will be 
evidence of a lack of situation awareness. Identification of situation awareness will include 
recognition by network members of potential problems in their planning (such as developing 
contingency plans), whether they view problems as opportunities (as opposed to threats), and if 
the network is reliant on limited sources of information or willing to search out new perspectives,  
as it is suggested in the literature that brittle organizations assume they will be successful while 
resilience organizations plan to struggle (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007).  
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Table 3-1. Governance network resilience model 
Feature Definition Measurement Source 
Slack in 
Resources 
Reserves of financial, social, 
structural and/or behavioural 
resources 
Evidence that the network is not overstretched in 
resource allocation; ability to tap into new sources 
of funding, partnerships, support when necessary. 
Vogus & 
Sutcliffe. 
Adaptive 
Capacity 
Culture and dynamics that 
allow participants to make 
decisions in a timely and 
appropriate manner (including 
flexibility) 
Evidence of attempts/success at altering strategy, 
operations, structure, decision-making capabilities 
to support positive adjustment 
McManus 
et al; 
Sutcliffe & 
Vogus 
(Efficacy) 
Situation 
Awareness 
Perception of operating 
environment; 
acknowledgement of threats 
and opportunities; awareness 
of limitations and stakeholder 
expectations. 
Evidence of communication, coordination in the 
network with regards to anticipation of potential 
problems, obligations to stakeholders, deference 
to expertise, capacity building. 
McManus 
et al; 
Vogus & 
Sutcliffe 
(Mindful 
organizing) 
 
 The features laid out in this network resilience model will be explored and evaluated 
through interviews with key informants who participated in the cases and in the network as well 
as through reviews of primary sources including reports, minutes of meetings, annual reports and 
correspondence of individuals and organizations involved in the wildlife health network.  An 
evaluation then follows of actions and attitudes supporting (or refuting) the necessary qualities 
for a resilient network.  
 Through this analysis, we will be able to begin to assess how networks use their flexible 
and collaborative arrangements to tackle emergent problems and determine if the beneficial 
features of governance networks translate into resilient practices or if it instead places networks 
in a vulnerable position. A comparative assessment of the two cases will then provide insight 
into the necessity of resilience for successful policy outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE INTER-AGENCY 
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 
4.1 The Disease 
 
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) that 
affects cervids (hoofed mammals of the family Cervidae): including mule deer, white-tailed deer, 
elk and moose. TSEs are a class of degenerative illnesses caused by misfolded prions (a 
proteinaceous infectious particle) in the brain and nervous system (Cashman, 1997).  Other TSEs 
include Scrapie, Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, often referred to as ‘Mad cow 
disease’) and variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (the human variation of BSE). CWD is a fatal 
disease that is currently untreatable; it is associated with behavioural changes and severe weight 
loss. It has a long incubation period and is therefore difficult to detect until an advanced stage 
when further transmission has already likely occurred. The exact methods and rate of 
transmission are still being determined; however, it is known that transmission can occur 
laterally- between animals- as well as through contaminated environmental material 
(Wasserberg, 2009).  
 The first identifiable cases of CWD presented in Colorado in the 1960s and it is 
commonly assumed that infected animals moved from a South Dakota game farm introduced the 
disease to Canada. In 1996, CWD was first detected in elk on a game farm in Saskatchewan; six 
years later it was diagnosed in deer on a game farm in Alberta (Kahn et al., 2004).  While CWD 
affects livestock, it is also found in wild animals. The first identification of the disease in wildlife 
was an elk in Saskatchewan in 2000 (Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative, 2015b), since that 
time it has spread to wild deer and moose in both Saskatchewan and Alberta.  
Prior to Chronic wasting disease being found in wildlife, TSEs in Canada were primarily 
contained in livestock, in the form of Scrapie (affecting sheep) or BSE (affecting cows). Any 
presence of TSEs in Canada was mainly an economic concern due to trade sanctions imposed on 
countries with confirmed cases of BSE in livestock. BSE has not been found in wild animals and 
the effects of Scrapie on wild sheep has been minimal. The fallout of one confirmed case of BSE 
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in Alberta in 2003 included border closures for Canadian beef to the U.S. for several months, 
herd reductions of over one million head of cattle and a drop in beef prices by 75% (Petigara, 
Dridi & Unterschultz, 2011). While the farmed cervid industry, consisting of animals like elk, 
deer, moose and caribou, is not nearly as large as the beef industry, estimates from Petigara et al. 
(2011) suggest that over $40 million a year is contributed to the Canadian economy from cervid 
game farms. The researchers suggest that a large scale outbreak of CWD would have a number 
of economic and social costs including diminishing consumer demand for cervid livestock, 
international trade restrictions, and negative impacts to communities reliant on cervid hunting or 
the hunting trade (Petigara et al., 2011, p. 1612). The broader economic implications of a CWD 
outbreak would not be as widespread as the BSE outbreak in Canada and the UK, however, it 
would still be catastrophic for the cervid game industry in Western Canada. 
The ability to detect CWD in the wild is a principle challenge in the attempt to eradicate 
the disease. There is a long incubation period between infection and the clinic onset of the 
disease, thought to be at least 16 months, during which the disease is undetected (U.S. 
Geological Survey National Wildlife Health Centre, 2013). During this time, wildlife can 
migrate across large distances, shedding infectious prions and exposing the infection to new 
herds. While a vaccine has been developed and is being tested, there is, as of yet, no treatment 
for the disease, culling the entire herd where an infected animal is found is the primary means to 
prevent the spread of disease.  
The presence of  CWD in domestic elk and deer being raised on game farms in Alberta 
and Saskatchewan led to a Chronic wasting disease eradication program and the ‘Chronic 
wasting disease Voluntary Herd Certification Program’, both regulated and administered by the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency.  The eradication program began on a voluntary basis in 
January 2001 but was upgraded to mandatory surveillance and eradication of suspected infected 
cervids by December of that year for farmed herds in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and 
Yukon (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2012). It is estimated that government and industry 
spent upwards of $40 million attempting to eradicate the disease on farms in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan between 2000 and 2005, yet CWD has proven challenging to fully eradicate and 
has even spread to new species in the wild (Technical Working Group, 2005). 
4.2 The Network in Action 
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There is a clear regulatory regime for reporting diseases in livestock at both the 
provincial and federal levels. The discovery of CWD in wild animals presented a new challenge, 
as the disease management framework for wildlife had not been as thoroughly developed. The 
National Wildlife Disease Strategy had been written and approved in theory, but had not, as of 
yet been operationalized. The governance implications of CWD’s spread to wildlife meant that 
the number of stakeholders involved grew beyond agricultural and food safety regulatory 
agencies to include wildlife and natural resource departments from the Saskatchewan, Alberta 
and Canadian governments (including the Canadian Wildlife Service, Environment Canada, 
Alberta’s Department of Environment and Sustainable Resource Development and 
Saskatchewan’s Ministry of Environment).   
In order to tackle the threat of CWD in Western Canada, members of the wildlife health 
community of public servants, researchers, academics and NGOs in Canada began coordinating 
efforts and formed an inter-agency, cross jurisdictional network. Acknowledging the absence of 
federal standards for assessing and managing wildlife health crises, the network dedicated their 
efforts to working on a management plan for CWD in wild cervids. Research by a number of the 
network members suggested that if CWD were left unchecked in the wild, the disease could 
potentially decimate the population of cervids in Canada, both in the wild and raised as livestock 
(Bollinger et al., 2004). Key members of this network included provincial biologists and 
Ministry staff from Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario and Manitoba as well as researchers from the 
Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative. 
 One of the network’s first tasks was to gather some of the world’s foremost experts on 
prion diseases to assess the Canadian situation from a scientific perspective. The group, which 
included academics and scientists from Canada, Australia, Belgium and the U.S., gathered with 
government representatives and other stakeholders for two days in Saskatoon in June 2004 to 
discuss the state of CWD in Canada. The panel was tasked with assessing the threat CWD posed 
to Canadian wildlife and to identify the knowledge gaps that could potentially be filled by policy 
intervention.  
Eight weeks later the panel released a report entitled ‘Chronic wasting disease in 
Canadian wildlife: An expert opinion on the epidemiology and risks to wild deer’ in which they 
advocated “aggressive regional and national management and research response to prevent 
further spread of CWD and to control or eliminate the disease in wild cervids” (Bollinger et al., 
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2004, p. 3). There was, the panel suggested, a unique opportunity to eliminate the disease as it 
had only recently taken hold in Canada and is known to be highly resilient once endemic to a 
population (Bollinger et al., 2004, p. 15). The chief recommendation, given the lack of detection 
and treatment options available for CWD, was a strategy of surveillance and population 
reduction coordinated nationally for the greatest coverage and impact. Based on the latest science 
at the time, the suggestion was made to keep cervid populations down to a density of one per km² 
for between five to ten years in order to allow the possibility of both environmental and lateral 
transmission to reduce in wildlife management zones home to the disease (Bollinger et al., 2004, 
p. 14).  
The release of the panel’s report generated moderate levels of media attention, including 
articles in the Globe and Mail and coverage in industry-specific publications. (Smith, 2004; 
Raine, 2004). Raising the profile of CWD as a problem in Canada is exactly what the organizers 
of the panel intended. In an email from April 26, 2004 to a potential funder, one of the panel 
organizers suggested that the panel would be a source of highly credible scientific information on 
the disease and would likely pressure the federal and provincial governments to allocate 
resources to its eradication. The assumption of the organizers was that the experts would 
acknowledge the potentially devastating impact CWD could have on Canadian wildlife and 
would highlight the current lack of capacity to undertake any of the proposed strategies without 
significant investment: 
Thus, we anticipate that the panel’s report can be used to catalyze a new inter- 
jurisdictional dialogue about CWD in wild deer in Canada that might cause provinces  
to pool some resources to fill essential knowledge gaps about the disease in wild deer. 
In our view, if provinces, with or without federal partnership, do not take this disease 
seriously and finance the surveillance and subsequent management actions to control or 
eradicate it in wildlife,  CWD will soon expand its range sufficiently that few 
management options will remain. It will be beyond control. Thus, either action is taken 
soon, or not at all… It certainly also is true that the panel and its report can simply be 
ignored by responsible agencies.  However, this will be no different from the current 
state of affairs (Personal communication, April, 26, 2004). 
 
Within a month of the Chronic wasting disease (CWD) expert panel’s report being 
released the Joint Ministers Council instructed the Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee 
(CWDC) to develop a national CWD control strategy as the first attempt to operationalize the 
National Wildlife Disease Strategy (Technical Working Group, 2005).  The network was 
formalized as the ‘Inter-agency Oversight Committee’ (IOC) by the CWDC. A core group of 
network members were designated as the Technical Working Group who would author the 
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control strategy. Two additional subgroups were designated to provide input: a stakeholder 
committee and a science advisory group. Given the location of the outbreak, a senior 
representative from Saskatchewan’s Ministry of Environment would act as chair to both the IOC 
and the Technical Working Group. The Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative (headquartered at 
the University of Saskatchewan) would act as secretariat for the IOC. Members of the existing 
network who were already collaborating on the issue participated in the IOC. 
All members of the IOC were still responsible to their home jurisdiction but were also 
responsible to the Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee to “assure the integration and 
collaboration among the programs and policies of all relevant jurisdictions and legislated 
authorities that are required for successful implementation of the Chronic Wasting Disease 
Control Strategy and achievement of its goals” (Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee, 2005). 
In an attempt to gain support beyond the wildlife health community, the Chair of the IOC invited 
staff from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), the Public Health Agency of Canada 
and Saskatchewan’s ministries of Health and Agriculture to be part of the committee (Inter-
Agency Oversight Committee for Chronic Wasting Disease, 2005d). 
By fall 2005 a national Chronic wasting disease Control Strategy had been developed 
with input from staff of agriculture and wildlife departments of Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba, the CFIA, Parks Canada, Ontario Ministry of Natural resources and as well as CWHC. 
The goal of the strategy was to eradicate or control as much as possible the transmission of the 
disease in both wildlife and farmed animals in order to reduce the impact on wildlife, the 
environment and the economy (Technical Working Group, 2005). The plan was intended to be 
seen as a complementary process that integrated new programs and policies with those that 
already existed at the provincial and federal levels into a coordinated national policy. The 
overarching principles for both the creation and implementation of the strategy were described 
as: 1) “full and open collaboration; 2) use of the best available science; 3) close vertical and 
horizontal integration among jurisdictions; 4) careful, strategic investment of new resources; and 
5) adaptive management, such that cycles evaluation and revision of program actions are integral 
components of all policies and programs.” (Technical Working Group, 2005, p. 1). 
The control strategy covered the full spectrum of management issues. The six goals of the 
strategy were: prevention of further spread of the disease; early detection through surveillance; a 
planned response to various outbreak scenarios; effective management through use of an 
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‘adaptive risk assessment and response framework’; education and training for those who would 
be involved in implementing the plan and communication to achieve the collaboration necessary 
to put the plan into action (Technical Working Group, 2005). The document laid out the broad 
strokes of approaches that should be taken to achieve each goal but did not speak to the specifics 
of achieving goals nor who would be responsible for funding the work or implementing it.  
Additional documents were later authored as action plans for each of the six goals once 
the plan was approved by the Joint Ministers Council. The action plans were the detailed 
documents laying out the tasks that needed to be completed to achieve each of the goals, as well 
as which network member(s) would be responsible for the tasks over the 5 to 10 years of the 
plan’s lifespan. The guidelines for the action plans specifically stated that cost estimation was 
not to be part of the discussion at this point: “The TWG has been given a clear mandate to 
develop a Strategy and Action Plans that are based in science and CWD control objectives and 
that are developed independent from cost considerations” (Technical Working Group, 2004, p. 
2). 
With each version of the control strategy and action plan documents, plans were 
increasingly refined and cost estimates and timelines were eventually added.  The control 
strategy and action plan documents were seen by the IOC and other members of the network as 
another attempt to sell the importance of the problem and find a place on the agenda of those 
with the means to provide financial support for this work. In an email dated September 1, 2004 
one provincial staffer on the IOC indicated that “[we] see this as a means to engage senior 
officials and solicit the political support needed to secure the resources essential to immediate 
and long term action”.  
After the release of the panel’s report and throughout 2005, the network was actively 
searching for the best ways to find political and financial support for their plan. The Canadian 
Wildlife Directors Committee, while a valuable resource for legitimacy and support for cross-
jurisdictional policies, has little internal funding to support the programs they champion. 
Attention turned to eliciting support from Ministers and their deputies in charge of wildlife, 
natural resources and environment at the provincial, territorial and federal levels. In an email to 
the other members of the IOC on September 7, 2004, one Alberta provincial staffer advocated 
focusing on national political support and funding in order to make the largest impact and have 
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the greatest chance of success at eradicating Chronic wasting disease, other members agreed with 
this direction.  
Building support with bureaucrats and politicians with responsibility for wildlife health 
was seen as a crucial step; however, having a control strategy that was primarily authored by 
wildlife experts and focused on wildlife health was seen as a limitation to the control strategy’s 
political legitimacy. There was some concern from agriculture representatives in the Inter-agency 
Oversight Committee that early drafts of the control strategy would give a Minister responsible 
for wildlife final authority on programs that involved the jurisdiction of Agriculture ministries, 
such as regulations for game farm disease eradication. (Inter-Agency Oversight Committee for 
Chronic Wasting Disease, 2005b). The consensus from the IOC was that more explicit inclusion 
of Agriculture’s authority and participation in the creation of the plan would be preferable to 
having a control strategy that only dealt with wildlife. Similarly, the inclusion of the 
Stakeholder’s Committee was seen as an important step to having both environmental groups 
and the cervid industry embrace the plan they have ‘consulted’ on (Inter-Agency Oversight 
Committee for Chronic Wasting Disease, 2005b). 
In June 2005 at a meeting of the Deputy Ministers responsible for wildlife, the control 
strategy was reviewed and approved ‘in theory’ with the intention to present the plan to the next 
formal meeting of the Joint Ministers Council in October. An email from the IOC Chairman on 
June 13, 2005 to the rest of the committee stated that staff from Environment Canada suggested 
that if the provincial Ministers approved the plan, they would have enough support to request 
$85 million for the control strategy from the federal government. The Joint Ministers responsible 
for Forestry, Wildlife, Endangered Species and Fisheries and Aquaculture did formally approve 
the strategy on October 5, 2005 which led the IOC to begin planning how to move forward.  
The network’s discussions were primarily focused on how to fully engage all levels of 
federal, provincial and territorial government. Gathering the formal support of Ministers of 
Agriculture and Health, which had not been achieved to this point, in order to strengthen the case 
for funding was of concern according to the record of the IOC meeting, as was the need to ensure 
adequate representation of various levels of government with interest in wildlife health issues. 
One member of the IOC had identified a Minister who held a dual portfolio of Natural Resources 
and Health who was willing to present the case to federal, provincial and territorial Health 
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Ministers and the group were tasked with finding someone on the Agriculture side with similar 
influence (Inter-Agency Oversight Committee for Chronic Wasting Disease, 2005d). 
Despite the encouraging progress in developing a large scale disease control strategy, 
Alberta and Saskatchewan continued to be affected by the presence of CWD in their cervid 
populations. Targeted culling- as advocated in the control strategy- was put in place in both 
provinces, as well as surveillance and eased restrictions on deer and elk hunters (MacArthur, 
2009). The network began coordinating data management between jurisdictions and collecting 
data about cervid density and population to help research and program planning (Inter-Agency 
Oversight Committee for Chronic Wasting Disease, 2005d). In addition, a November 2005 
investment from the Network Centres of Excellence project created PrioNet, a prion research 
centre. PrioNet was mandated to devote a portion of their research expenditure towards Chronic 
wasting disease. PrioNet’s researchers committed to assisting with the CWD control strategy by 
helping close knowledge gaps (Wong et al., 2011). 
 
4.2.2 The 2006 Federal Election 
 
A federal election was held on January 23, 2006 in which the governing Liberal party 
was replaced by a Conservative minority government. This change seemingly shuttered hopes of 
receiving any significant investment towards a national wildlife disease strategy from the federal 
government. The network received notice that Environment Canada would not have any direct 
funding available for the control strategy (such as the $85 million Environment Canada staffers 
were planning to request) but that there could be some opportunity for smaller funding through 
existing grant schemes like the Invasive Alien Species Partnership Program. The average 
contribution through this program was just over $25,000, while the Chronic wasting disease 
control strategy budget was estimated at $50 million over 5 years (Environment Canada, 2012a). 
This was an obvious blow to the network as their work had focused on acquiring support and 
leadership from the federal government. In light of this change and the finalization of the control 
strategy and action plans, IOC activity on CWD was minimal for the next two years. Both 
Alberta and Saskatchewan continued their surveillance and culling activities in line with the 
CWD control strategy at the limited levels they were able to fund through their own provincial 
budgets. 
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In the fall of 2008 there was some renewed interest in discussing the progression of 
Chronic wasting disease within Alberta and Saskatchewan by the Canadian Wildlife Directors 
Committee (Inter-Agency Oversight Committee for Chronic Wasting Disease, 2008). This 
allowed an opportunity for various provincial wildlife and agriculture staffers who represented 
many of the agencies in the CWD Inter-agency Oversight Committee (IOC) to communicate to a 
national forum the challenges of implementing a disease control strategy with limited support.  
Provincial staffers and academics in the affected areas wanted to once again bring 
attention to the ongoing threat of CWD, to identify what components of the control strategy were 
helping to mitigate the disease threat and to develop a way to build the needed support from the 
rest of the country. Key critiques and observations from members of the IOC communicated 
through emails in October 2008 included the sense that a lack of federal funds was ‘stifling’ the 
success of the control strategy and that centralized leadership and accountability would be 
valuable to ensure adequate political support and funding. The lack of centralized leadership and 
support resulted in funding being available in jurisdictions without CWD cases. This funding 
was unavailable to those conducting research, surveillance or implementing the management 
plan  in areas with CWD cases, like Saskatchewan and Alberta. The Wildlife Directors provided 
no official feedback or plan of action to the network when presented with this update on CWD 
challenges.  
Two years later PrioNet and the Alberta Prion Research Institute (APRI), with the 
assistance of the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative (CWHC), sponsored two workshops to 
assess the progress made in CWD management over the five years since the first control strategy 
was written. The first workshop attempted to identify what tools were most needed to combat the 
disease as well as what management objectives were achievable given the current state of affairs. 
Canadian and U.S. experts briefed the participants on scientific advances made since 2005 as 
well as challenges that had arisen in attempting to execute the original strategy. Key challenges 
articulated during the workshop by wildlife and animal health managers included the lack of 
public support for culling strategies, the high expense of controlling CWD on game farms and 
“the lack of political will to provide long-term funding support” which undermines the idea that 
CWD is a serious problem (Alberta Prion Research Institute et al., 2011b, p. 7). 
The second workshop began a revision of the Chronic wasting disease control strategy 
based on the results of the consultations with wildlife and animal health managers. According to 
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an early draft, it appears as though the focus of many of the changes made to the strategy were 
meant to temper expectations given the ongoing struggle to manage CWD outbreaks. For 
example, goals were now stated as disease management and containment, whereas previous 
documents often included the overall goal of CWD eradication. Eradication did not seem feasible 
any longer. This new draft also changed the language used to reflect the fact that certain 
elements of the control strategy are underway and not simply a plan the participants are waiting 
to enact, as waiting was not an option (Alberta Prion Research Institute et al., 2011a). The 
ultimate result of the second workshop was a new version of the control strategy published by 
PrioNet, APRI and CWHC which was then disseminated to the Canadian Wildlife Directors 
Committee, the Council of Chief Veterinary Officers and the Council of Chief Medical Officers 
of Health.  
The question of how to move the strategy into a formal policy was primarily advanced by 
the Executive Director of CWHC and a network member who was both a former Environment 
Canada and Canadian Food Inspection Agency staffer. Framing CWD as an environmental 
contaminant (as prions are shed into nature and do not degrade for long periods), they shifted 
from working with Canadian Wildlife Services (which exists as a subsection of Environment 
Canada) and approached staff within Environment Canada’s department of Legislative and 
Regulatory Affairs.  According to an April 19, 2011 email from the director of the CWHC, the 
hope was to secure either financial or regulatory authority within the federal government 
(specifically under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act) so that there could be 
partnership and coordination with the provinces to address CWD. The communications between 
network members suggest that Environment Canada’s budget made it impossible to address new 
endeavours as the department had been subject to several rounds of cutbacks (Lui, 2011).  
Six months later, a further development appeared to signal the end of the collaborative 
efforts to develop a national control strategy. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency provided 
wildlife and agricultural stakeholders, including the Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee, 
with a report on their proposal to change CFIA’s approach from eradication to minimizing the 
geographic spread of CWD (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2011). Communications 
between network members indicate that this move was seen as CFIA relinquishing their 
responsibility for actively manage the disease in Alberta and Saskatchewan, as all cervids from 
both provinces would be assumed to have the disease and not be used for commercial purposes.   
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An email dated November 11, 2011 between the Executive Director of CWHC and the 
former Environment Canada and CFIA staffer suggests a disappointment with the lack of 
engagement from the regulatory side of Environment Canada and the developments with CFIA. 
They acknowledge that using their connections to federal policy makers remains an ongoing 
option but that on their own the network does not have the influence, authority or knowledge to 
initiate the needed policy action regardless of how they frame the disease threat. 
4.3 Network Resilience 
 
According to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Chronic wasting disease is now 
endemic to Saskatchewan and parts of Alberta (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2011). One 
reading of the above narrative suggests that the wildlife health network had not been particularly 
successful at attacking and eradicating CWD before it was considered endemic and therefore 
unable to be easily eradicated. Given the challenges facing wildlife disease experts and the lack 
of resources available to them, this hardly seems surprising or unexpected.  
Despite the lack of financial resources and formal political support, the network did 
valuable work by engaging experts and decision makers in the development of the initial national 
CWD Control Strategy in 2005 and an updated strategy in 2011. The control strategy was put 
into practice at the provincial level by Alberta and Saskatchewan as a guide for action in dealing 
with CWD in captive and wild animals. As well, the control strategy and the National Wildlife 
Disease Strategy still exists as a template to deal with wildlife disease outbreaks (Environment 
Canada, 2005).  
Part of the network’s lobbying efforts also resulted in Chronic wasting disease being 
added to PrioNet’s research agenda and funding allocation, according to an email from a CWHC 
staffer to the network on October 24, 2008. Also, and potentially most importantly, this 
interagency collaboration appears to have been a model for collaboration on future issues, such 
as West Nile Virus and strains of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. These outcomes suggest 
there had been value in the network’s work on CWD, despite its limited impact on controlling 
the disease. 
In assessing how the network operated, the event that appears to be the most significant 
stumbling block was the change of federal government in 2006. The timing of the election and 
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change of government was particularly challenging as the control strategy proposal was about to 
be presented to the federal cabinet. The proposal never reached cabinet, let alone secured a 
commitment prior to the election. In addition, significant cutbacks and reorganization occurred 
within Environment Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) in both 2006 and 
2011 (Lui, 2011). The change of federal government and the organizational restructuring 
ostensibly undermined months of negotiations network members engaged in with deputy 
ministers at the federal, provincial and territorial levels. The budget cut backs not only meant 
that there was less possibility of funding a CWD control strategy but also that other departments, 
like the CFIA, were having to relinquish their existing disease management protocols to meet 
with the government’s new priorities. In order to meet budget targets, the CFIA committed 
‘streamlining regulatory requirements’, one of which was removing regulations for the 
mandatory eradication of livestock herds found with CWD in Saskatchewan and Alberta 
(Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2013). This act compromised the health of wild cervids in 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, as transmission between captive and wild animals was common 
when dealing with CWD. 
There is no doubt that the network’s success was stymied by the loss of momentum after 
the 2006 election. What is worth noting is that the network persisted for more than five years 
after the change of government.  This would suggest that the network was not solely reliant on 
this one opportunity to secure funding and leadership for the CWD control strategy. The 
organizational resilience model set out in chapter three can provide insight into why the network 
persisted over time despite this setback; as well, it can explain which factors ultimately lead to 
intractable obstacles the network was unable to overcome. 
4.3.1 Slack in Resources 
 
The first essential quality in the organizational resilience model is slack in resources. 
Slack in resources indicates that the organization or network is not overextended in its financial, 
cognitive or social commitments. As explained in chapter three, an organization or network that 
does not have slack in resources often finds itself strained and is unable to meet new or 
unexpected challenges because its resources are already committed elsewhere. Evidence of slack 
in resources can take a number of forms including the ability to attract new partners to the 
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network, to find and use new information, to have contingency funds or the ability to reallocate 
funds to new opportunities or challenges as well as having political support to move the 
network’s agenda forward. 
We can see evidence of all of these attributes early on in the network’s work on Chronic 
wasting disease, however over time various forms of support were exhausted. The financial 
resources of the network were an overarching issue throughout, as the bulk of the problem of 
putting the CWD control strategy into action was framed as a lack of financial support (and 
leadership) from the federal authorities. The network itself has no operating budget that it can 
draw from but is rather reliant on the support of the employers of its members and its ability to 
attract new funding.  
The network was able to use its partnerships to secure support for essential meetings and 
conferences such as the 2004 Expert Panel and the sessions to author both versions of the control 
strategy. The Expert Panel was supported not only by the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative 
(through its operating funds from Canada’s veterinary colleges) and by the Canadian Wildlife 
Directors Committee but also through the support of the environmental group the Canadian 
Wildlife Federation, which was approached by the network for funding in the planning stages. 
The provinces that participated in the control strategy planning sessions (Alberta, Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba) also contributed by sending their network members to meetings across Canada at 
various points and both of the prion research institutes in Canada (PrioNet and APRI) were 
funders and hosts of the 2011 updated controls strategy meetings in Edmonton and Saskatoon. 
The lack of funding for the actual implementation of the control strategy from the federal 
government was particularly problematic for the network as its goal was that federal wildlife, 
agriculture and animal health leadership would rally the provinces towards executing the CWD 
control strategy (Inter-Agency Oversight Committee for Chronic Wasting Disease, 2008). In an 
email exchange to members of the forum on October 23, 2008, members of the network also 
lamented the fact that provinces with funding and political support for CWD control such as 
Manitoba and Ontario were not willing or able to contribute to research or control strategies 
undertaken in Saskatchewan and Alberta. The financial requirements of implementing the 
control strategy, estimated at $10 million per year, were large enough that there were limited 
options for who would fund the program to a satisfactory point. Alberta and Saskatchewan both 
suspended their culling programs by 2012, indicating a lack of funds to reduce wild herds 
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(MacArthur, 2012). Emails by network members in November 2011 indicate that the programs, 
agencies or departments that would normally be avenues of financial support were undergoing 
budget cuts, therefore support from bureaucrats would be limited. 
In terms of social resources, two observations are worth noting. The first is that the 
network appears to be well connected and is able to gain the attention and assistance of a variety 
of policy makers and academics. We see evidence of this in the group of researchers who 
comprised the initial panel of CWD experts, as well as in the membership of the Interagency 
Oversight Committee involved with the control strategy in 2005. There are two types of 
participants, the first being individuals who are participating due to the nature of their 
employment, such as provincial wildlife staffers from Alberta and Saskatchewan who are 
assigned to work on Chronic wasting disease and can use all the support at their disposal. The 
second group of participants are those who are experts or experienced in the wildlife policy 
realm and have a desire to assist their peers (or have been convinced to assist the network). This 
includes the members of the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative, who work on wildlife health 
issues in their capacities as academics and veterinary researchers, and individuals who are 
outside experts in prion diseases or wildlife health who all appear to have a sense of duty 
regarding mitigating CWD. The network was also able to secure the support of various deputy 
ministers and ministers from Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture ministries as well 
as the Canadian Wildlife Directors who approved and supported the CWD control strategy.  
The second observation on social resources is that bureaucratic support does not 
necessarily translate to action. While the Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee and other high 
level government officials agreed that Chronic wasting disease was a serious issue facing 
Canadian wildlife, there was little action to fund the control strategy or lead the charge for 
implementation of the plan. It has been established that Canada’s wildlife disease infrastructure 
is strained beyond capacity and without strong political support or a public sense of urgency; 
there is little likelihood of securing the kind of funds that would make a difference in eradicating 
CWD. 
An additional area in which slack is advantageous according to the organizational 
resilience theory is in cognitive resources. Cognitive resources include new individuals (such as 
the aforementioned expert panel) as well as new perspectives and information resources to assist 
in decision and policymaking. As we will see below, the network is well placed to support new 
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discoveries and information inputs as the majority of participants are research scientists working 
on closing the knowledge gaps in CWD. What appears to have been a major stumbling block is 
how new and unknown Chronic wasting disease was when the network first attempted to get 
government support for its eradication. It can be argued that while the network made an ongoing 
effort to include the latest information on the disease in their planning, there was little to no 
cognitive slack as they were at the forefront of CWD management strategies and there was little 
new information. Given the emerging nature of the disease, the network was presented with few 
options. 
 In 2015 testing began on a Chronic wasting disease vaccine that appears to be an 
alternative to wide-scale deer and elk culling (Goñi et al., 2015). When dealing with the initial 
outbreak in 2004, the methods and rates of transmission were still unconfirmed and there was no 
way to confirm the disease in a live subject (Bollinger et al., 2004). As a result, the network was 
limited in what approaches it could offer to government and in turn, the offer of a comprehensive 
plan to survey, contain and cull animals affected by the disease was deemed either too expensive 
or too invasive or the problem remained of little concern. The fact that Chronic wasting disease 
was an emerging disease of significant complexity should not be overlooked as a key challenge 
to adapting the scientific advice to government on how to control the threat of CWD in a feasible 
way. 
4.3.2 Adaptive Capacity 
 
The second element of the organizational resilience model is adaptive capacity. 
Organizations or networks that are seemingly able to cope with challenges are those that have the 
ability to adjust their operations to fit their new reality. Adaptive capacity is seen as the result of 
a culture and/or leadership that is willing and able to embrace change as well as being 
information-seeking and deferring to expertise (rather than authority) (McManus et al., 2008). 
What appears to be present in this case is a network mindset that embraces adaptive capacity but 
that does not always have the opportunity or knowledge to put into practice different approaches 
that would improve their position.  The network appears to have been entirely too reliant on the 
possibility that the federal government would provide financial resources and leadership. Rather 
than accepting that no significant funds or leadership support would be coming from the Harper 
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government and developing collaborative plans with the affected provinces, the network 
continued to hold out hope and return to a seemingly dry well looking for water.  
The failure to adapt approaches, which appears to be due to not having a clear 
understanding of how to move forward with a national disease strategy without federal 
involvement, can be seen as a limitation of both adaptive capacity and situation awareness. Not 
having an understanding of how to change approaches, and not fully understanding the severity 
of the regime change at Environment Canada, suggests the network was limited in its 
understanding of the operating environment, which is a requirement for successful situation 
awareness. Without an understanding of how to proceed, the network deferred to experience and 
employed the standard practice of providing solid evidence-based advice to government then 
waiting for a response. There is overlap in the processes that contribute to resilience, as they are 
not discrete characteristics. It also appears that despite the failure to adapt approaches for 
securing political support, they actively pursued adaptive and information-seeking behaviour 
around the disease management plan for Chronic wasting disease. 
The wildlife health network, throughout their work on Chronic wasting disease, 
consistently prioritized adaptability as one of the guiding principles in the development of the 
control strategy plans. While that could be considered lip service, as there was no fundamental 
change in the approach taken to garner support over time, it appears to be genuine as one of the 
key practices in wildlife disease is adaptive management. The adaptive management approach 
allows practitioners to ensure continual improvement and refinement in their plans or programs 
in the face of limited knowledge. By integrating monitoring and evaluation into the program 
development process, adaptive management allows researchers to develop hypotheses and test 
them in the real world environment. If they are successful, they can be incorporated into the 
program; if not, a better alternative will be found (Wassenberg, 2009).  
Other indications of the network being information seeking include starting the 
development of both versions of the control strategy (in 2005 and then in 2011) with a search for 
both the most up to date knowledge on the disease and an overview of the key knowledge gaps 
(Bollinger et al., 2004, p. 18-19; Alberta Prion Research Institute et al., 2011a, p. 11-12). As 
well, the practice of updating the control strategy after five years is another method of ensuring 
the programs are being evaluated and renewed with the newest available information. Beyond 
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this, members of the network were involved in primary research to better understand the disease 
to better manage its outbreak (PrioNet, 2011). 
The network’s commitment to being information-seeking and deferring to expertise is 
implicit in its commitment to scientific inquiry. The other indicators of adaptive capacity, 
however, such as a cultural or leadership commitment to embracing change in the face of a 
challenge and increased communication in crisis times are less apparent. If we identify the 
challenge in this case as the inability to secure funding and leadership from the federal 
government for a control or eradication program for Chronic wasting disease, then it appears that 
in the face of setbacks (be they changes in government or indications that no funding is 
available) the network only committed to revamping and reselling the control strategy. What did 
not happen was an evaluation of how to approach the federal government with a different plan or 
how to translate the existing provincial support into a multi-jurisdictional coordinated control 
strategy without federal support. Another telling indicator of limited adaptive capacity is the 
distinct lack of communication that occurs after setbacks. Once the control strategy was written 
and the proposal to the federal cabinet fell through in early 2006, there are no records of any 
committees or forums meeting until 2008 when the Canadian Wildlife Directors specifically 
requested an update on CWD management. In addition, between 2008 and 2010 when planning 
began for the second draft of the control strategy, the only activities on record consisted of 
members of the network who work directly for Alberta and Saskatchewan wildlife programs 
implementing those provinces’ management plan. 
There appears to be some inconsistency between in the network’s commitment to 
evaluate and adapt their policies for CWD and its inability to adapt its approach to decision 
makers given new developments. One possible explanation lies in the composition of the 
network: it is primarily composed of biologists and veterinarians not politicians or policy 
makers. Repeatedly, members of the network express the view that the facts of the situation (the 
spread and fatal nature of the disease) should spark a bureaucratic or political response 
(Leighton, 2004; Alberta Prion Research Institute et al., 2011a). This stimulus-response view of 
the policy process would explain why the network focused on developing a control strategy 
containing the best available science and the best management practices and pressed this strategy 
on governments for more than seven years. This is not to suggest that the network members are 
naïve about how government works, rather that they are experts in wildlife health, not the policy 
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process or in lobbying. According to an email from the director of the Canadian Wildlife Health 
Cooperative to a former Environment Canada staffer on October 24, 2011, the traditional 
protocol for getting a wildlife health issue on a government’s agenda is to provide a proposal or 
recommendation to the appropriate authority and wait for their response. This deference to the 
existing bureaucratic structure suggests a limitation of both the interest and ability of the network 
to work outside of traditional policy channels.  
4.3.3 Situation Awareness 
 
The third feature of the network resilience model is situation awareness, or the network’s 
awareness of the context in which it operates. The concept of situation awareness encompasses 
both self-awareness of its membership and capacity as well as insight into the external challenges 
it could possibly face. Situation awareness becomes relevant to resilience when the network uses 
its assessments to neutralize threats by proactively addressing them in their work or planning. 
Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007) argue that organizations that assume their work will always result in 
success are fragile because, unlike resilient organizations, they do not engage in the challenging 
work of identifying potential avenues of internal or external threats and possible failure. 
Evidence of situation awareness in the network comes primarily from network members’ 
acknowledgement of potential challenges or obstacles in their planning, their willingness to 
expose themselves to new perspectives as well as the awareness of stakeholder expectations or 
developments that would lead to problems. In addition to the network’s actions, situation 
awareness can be judged partially by the attitude that network members have towards problems 
and challenges. A view of problems as opportunities as opposed to threats suggests network 
members are more resilient and better equipped to overcome minor struggles. 
The wildlife health network has shown a strong awareness of potential challenges and 
failure from the earliest discussions of tackling Chronic wasting disease. This perspective 
appears to come from experiences working on wildlife health issues or issues that cross 
wildlife/livestock boundaries with provincial and federal governments in the past. Records of 
meetings of the network indicate that members were actively aware of the interjurisdictional 
challenges of developing and implementing a CWD management plan. They were fully aware of 
the particular challenge of infected animals on and around game farms where the Canadian Food 
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Inspection Agency (CFIA) would regulate the treatment of the livestock on the farm but not the 
wildlife likely infected by the livestock (Inter-agency Oversight Committee for Chronic Wasting 
Disease, 2005c).  
The network also showed foresight when it sought to include provincial and federal 
Agriculture and Health officials in their work in order to have a broad base of support for the 
CWD control strategy and buy-in from a number of fronts. Representatives from provincial 
Agriculture departments in Saskatchewan and Manitoba helped author the 2005 control strategy 
as part of the Technical Working Group, while federal representatives from the CFIA and Public 
Health Agency were given active roles on the IOC. While the majority of the Technical Working 
Group members were wildlife biologists, the IOC looked to its Agriculture and Health 
representatives to sell the plan to various provincial Deputy Ministers who could push support 
for the plan upwards (Inter-Agency Oversight Committee for Chronic Wasting Disease, 2005b). 
The process of evaluating and rewriting the control strategy, along with holding 
workshops with provincial and federal wildlife managers, Aboriginal leaders and academics in 
2011 can also be seen as a reflection of situation awareness as the network attempted to seek out 
new information, perspectives and input on the control strategy. There seemed to be awareness 
that the traditional strategy of securing support through the chain of authority in provincial 
wildlife departments, receiving commitments of support from the Canadian Wildlife Directors 
Committee and then getting the issue on the agenda of a federal/provincial/territorial ministers 
meeting for a national agreement was no longer feasible and that adjustments need to be made.  
The intention of these workshops was to re-evaluate the feasibility of both attempting to 
eradicate CWD and attempt to adjust the original plan to something that was both feasible in the 
current climate and could as much as possible ensure the original plan’s success (Alberta Prion 
Research Institute et al., 2011b). Along with the original expert panel in 2004, these 
collaborative gatherings show a desire and willingness to fully understand the operating context 
in which wildlife disease and disease management exist. The 2011 plan also recognized and 
articulated the obstacles facing those working to implement the control strategy. The new version 
of the strategy showed awareness of the political context by acknowledging that current disease 
management programs and objectives exceed the capacity of the jurisdictions attempting to 
implement them. The plan strongly suggests that approaches need to be developed that are within 
the resource and capacity limits of those agencies (Alberta Prion Research Institute et al., 2011b, 
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p. 6). In attempting to mitigate these problems, the control strategy contains management best 
practices and standards that allow one province to conduct their own surveillance and eradication 
without the development of a coordinated national program. 
The wildlife network was aware of the challenges facing their efforts from the network’s 
earliest meetings, the members chose to act in the hopes of eliciting some response from decision 
makers, rather than do nothing and face certain failure. One of the indicators of situation 
awareness is whether setbacks are seen as insurmountable or opportunities to improve. There is 
no indication that members of the network were overconfident in their ability to eradicate the 
disease, rather they were muted in their expectations of success. While soliciting funding from 
environmental groups, the Executive Director of the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative states 
that it is entirely possible governments could ignore the forthcoming report from the panel of 
prion experts and that their work may do nothing to change the status quo. What makes this 
awareness less fatalistic and more productive is that in an email, dated April 26, 2004, the 
Executive Director also describes the progress being made on the National Wildlife Disease 
Strategy in months previous as an reassuring development: “[t]he current advanced state of this 
initiative gives me faith that it is possible to turn seemingly intractable situations around and that 
agencies are willing and eager to work together to achieve mutual goals. It seems then that 
determined confrontation of CWD in wild deer in Canada also may be possible.  I think it is 
worth a good hard try”.  
Throughout the network’s communications there exists a cautious but hopeful attitude 
towards success. The chair of the Inter-agency Oversight Committee, in an email dated October 
7, 2005, informing the committee that the control strategy had been approved by the Federal-
Provincial-Territorial Resource Ministers Council, suggests that now that the control strategy and 
five year action plans have been approved: “the real work begins, in terms of finding funding, 
identifying lead agencies etc [sic] and bring [sic] the strategy to life!” The status quo of wildlife 
health services in Canada prior to the collaboration of the wildlife network was limited to what 
each individual province could manage on their own, limited budget. Provincial departments 
responsible for wildlife, like many other bureaucrats, are overwhelmed with the number of 
priorities vying for the scarce resources they have been allocated. When facing a crisis event, 
like Chronic wasting disease, the ability to work within a network to potentially bring additional 
resources and political support to help mitigate the disease appears to be a boon enough that the 
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network members are willing to weather potential challenges. Any positive action in their favour 
from government decision makers appears to provide encouragement to continue.  
The wildlife health network’s work on Chronic wasting disease was met with barriers at 
nearly every step of the way. The loss of momentum due to the change in federal government in 
2006 was something from which the network did not recover and as such the network’s attempt 
to mitigate the spread of Chronic wasting disease had little success. The network had a strong 
sense of situation awareness and realism about their prospects but did not have the needed 
financial or relational resources to implement its management plan. Most significantly, the 
network members did not have much experience in navigating political and regulatory barriers 
that are essential when facing conflicting priorities from a number of stakeholders in different 
jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE INTERAGENCY WHITE NOSE SYNDROME 
COMMITTEE 
5.1 The Disease 
Workers from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation made a 
startling discovery while surveying hibernacula (hibernation sites, in this instance caves) of local 
bats in March and April 2007. Hundreds, and in some instances thousands, of bat carcasses were 
found in the immediate area of four caves in Schoharie and Albany counties in northern New 
York. There were also unprecedented numbers of sightings of daytime flying bats and a record 
number of specimens submitted to the New York State Department of Health (Hicks et al., 
2007). Wildlife biologists were confounded at this unprecedented event and began the search for 
a reason for this mass mortality. This was the first point of contact biologists in North America 
had with a disease that would spread rapidly across the eastern seaboard bringing bat populations 
nearly to extinction, requiring significant international intervention to slow the spread of this 
mysterious illness. 
 The cause of the mass mortality of bats in New York was soon discovered to be a fungus 
called Pseudogymnoascus destrucans
1
, colloquially referred to as White nose syndrome (WNS) 
after the white substance found on the muzzles and wings of infected bats. P. destructans had 
never before been found in North America, despite being present in caves in Europe where bats 
are seemingly immune to the fungus (Foley, Clifford, Castle, Cryan & Ostfeld, 2011). WNS 
develops as a skin infection while the animal is hibernating, as the fungus thrives in the cold and 
humid conditions found in caves. It causes the animals to wake more often than normal from 
hibernation, resulting in an increased expenditure of the bat’s built up fat storage. The increased 
arousal and lack of food supply lead to starvation (Cryan , Meteyer, Boyles, & Blehert, 2013). 
Research is ongoing to discover the mechanism by which the disease disturbs the 
physiology of bats. However, a leading theory from Warnecke et al. suggests there is a 
connection between the skin infection on the wings of the bat and the physiological processes 
                                                          
1
 Prior to 2013 the fungus was misidentified as ‘Geomyces destructans’ in the literature due to a classification 
error; it has since been reclassified (Minnis & Linder, 2013). 
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that alert the animal to search for food and water. The fungus results in severe lesions on bats’ 
wings (as well as less drastic lesions on the face, muzzle and body), which are crucial to 
regulating temperature, water and carbon dioxide supplies and immune functions while 
hibernating. The damage to skin allows for fluid loss and the reduction of sodium levels in the 
blood. As well, the damage to connective tissue in the wing further increases fluid loss through 
increased vascular permeability. The seemingly superficial damage caused by the fungus triggers 
a series of complications that leads to increased respiratory rates and/or torpor arousal in 
conditions where food supplies are scarce resulting in death (Warnecke et al., 2013). 
 Two primary factors have caused White nose syndrome to sound a North American-wide 
alarm for the wellbeing of bats: the high mortality rate of bats infected with the disease and the 
disease’s ability to spread over wide areas in short periods of time. Reports from the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service indicate that WNS can result in a 95% mortality rate for hibernacula 
groupings over only two to three years. Coupled with the low birth rate of bats (1 per year), the 
threat of extinction is strong and imminent (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011). From its 
initial discovery near Albany, New York during the winter of 2007, WNS has spread as far west 
as the Washington state
2
, south to Georgia and north to Prince Edward Island in eight years. In 
Canada, five provinces have confirmed the presence of WNS since the winter of 2009-10: 
Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island (Canadian Wildlife 
Health Cooperative, 2015a).  
While it is suspected that the fungus was transported to the U.S. from Europe by a caver 
and human transmission remains a concern for wildlife protection agencies, the migratory nature 
of bats between their maternal roosting habitats and hibernacula present a greater challenge for 
those trying to limit the transmission of the fungus. In addition to concerns about the fast spread 
and high mortality rates, the unknowns of the disease early on included the uncertainty of WNS’ 
effect on humans as well as its means of transmission (Foley et al., 2011). It is now understood 
that WNS does not affect humans.  
 The public in North America generally considers bats a nuisance, however; they perform 
a crucial function in their ecosystems. Bats consume large numbers of pests every day, allowing 
them to act as a natural pest suppressor for agriculture. Areas with decreased populations of bats 
                                                          
2
 White Nose Syndrome has been confirmed in Washington State as of 2016; this is more than 2,000 kilometres 
west of the previous western area of infection (U.S. Geological Survey, 2016). 
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can see a greater population of insects and therefore a greater need for chemical insecticides. In 
certain areas, bats also act as seed distributors and nocturnal pollinators (U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, 2011).  The economic value of bats’ contribution to agriculture has not been determined 
beyond the value of one species of bat on one particular crop in eastern Texas (Boyles, Sole, 
Cryan, & McCraken, 2013). Boyles et al. suggest that bats may well be the most economically 
valuable wild mammals in the world and that a lack of firm understanding of their value (both 
economically and ecologically) allows the public and policy makers to underestimate the need to 
tackle threats like WNS. 
5.2 The Network in Action 
The discovery of the mass mortality in hibernating bats in Canada led to provincial and 
federal biologists along with wildlife researchers at Canadian universities to work together to 
understand and tackle the problem of WNS in Canada. Like the Chronic wasting disease 
problem, government officials and non-governmental organizations (including the Canadian 
Wildlife Health Cooperation) made the decision to convene periodic teleconferences to share 
surveillance data and research that was taking place regarding both slowing the spread of the 
disease and understanding how to treat or vaccinate bats. Unlike Chronic wasting disease, 
however, only the scale and speed of mortality were known when the disease was identified on 
Canadian soil (Daszak, 2010). The lack of information on the type of illness, methods of 
transmission and pathology added a level of difficulty to formulating a coherent policy response 
given the significant knowledge gaps present.  
 The Canadian WNS network began meeting in May 2010. The members of this group 
included provincial and territorial wildlife staff from across the country, with heavy participation 
from the affected provinces - Quebec and Ontario. University researchers from Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta and New Brunswick were also involved, along with the Canadian 
Wildlife Health Cooperative’s national office in Saskatoon and the Ontario/Northwest branch 
(who were conducting surveillance of bats under contract for the province of Ontario). The 
coordinator of the United States Fish and Wildlife Services’ (USFWS) WNS program also 
attended many of the meetings (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2010a). The 
membership of the group evolved as additional researchers became aware of the problem and as 
WNS spread eastward in Canada with researchers from New Brunswick and the CWHC’s 
Atlantic office becoming heavily active in leading network activities.  
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Prior to the discovery of WNS in Canada, the wildlife health network collaborated not 
only on a Chronic wasting disease mitigation strategy but also on management plans for Avian 
Influenza and West Nile virus in Canada. There was significant overlap between the membership 
of the individuals working on WNS and the Chronic wasting disease Inter-agency Oversight 
Committee. Most of the provincial and federal wildlife biologists active in the network 
participated in both cases, with the exception of those in the Atlantic provinces, as Chronic 
wasting disease was not seen to be a significant threat on the east coast of Canada. The Canadian 
Wildlife Health Cooperative (CWHC) was again acting as the coordinating agency for the group. 
The CWHC’s Executive Director had an active role in all of the network’s collaborative 
activities until his retirement in 2015. There have been some temporary members of the network, 
including individuals transferred within their agency away from the wildlife health portfolio. The 
most frequent change in membership are disease-specific pathologists and biologists who have 
in-depth knowledge of one species or disease. These individuals participate to share their 
knowledge and expertise for one type of disease without an ongoing commitment to the broader 
arena of wildlife health. 
The initial interactions of the WNS network focused on assessing the knowledge gap 
facing the network. In addition to determining how far WNS had spread in Canada, there were 
also discussions about the uncertainty of the numbers of bats, maternal colonies and hibernacula 
present in each province or territory. University researchers participating in the group were able 
to assist in providing some knowledge of bat habitat and newer surveillance techniques 
(Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2010a). By June 2010, the Canadian Wildlife 
Directors Committee, the group of wildlife directors for various federal, provincial and territorial 
governments who set national priorities aimed to coordinate wildlife policy across the country, 
had set three priorities for the management of WNS in Canada. The priorities were to develop a 
coordinated inter-governmental group to tackle WNS management in a consistent manner across 
Canada; to encourage the participation of the federal government in WNS management; and to 
evaluate the impact of WNS on bat populations (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 
2010b). 
As the wildlife health network had previously been asked by the CWDC to act as an 
inter-agency committee responsible for developing disease management plans for Chronic 
wasting disease and other diseases, and they were already sharing information on a regular basis, 
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formalizing the network’s actions was logical. In September of 2010 a formalized ‘White nose 
syndrome Management Group’ was formed under the authority of the CWDC and individual 
provinces represented by their wildlife staff. It essentially sanctioned the activities the network 
was already undertaking. The WNS Management Group’s initial goals were to author a policy 
response to the introduction of the disease in Canada as well as prepare for and attempt to 
mitigate the spread of the disease to new areas (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 
2010c).  
At this point in 2010, government staffers from the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) 
who were involved in the WNS Management Group informed the network members that budget 
cuts and reorganization within Environment Canada meant that there would likely be little to no 
federal government funding available to assist with the implementation of a national WNS 
management plan. CWS was able to provide assistance only on matters related to federal lands 
and animals designated ‘species at risk’ by the federal Species at Risk Act (SARA). It was noted 
that without the implementation and integration of the National Wildlife Disease Strategy 
(NWDS) at the federal level there was neither the political nor financial support for federal 
agencies to be actively engaged in wildlife disease management outside of federal lands 
(Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2010c).  
The chair of the early WNS meetings, a provincial biologist from Quebec, emailed the 
members of the WNS Management Group on September 13, 2010 noting the importance of 
having a nation-wide strategy. He requested all members ensure their minister or representative 
from the CWDC would be informed that the previously approved model of disease management 
(NWDS) could be used for a WNS plan, suggesting that the more wildlife directors that support 
the NWDS would mean it would be more likely to be on the agenda with provincial and federal 
decision makers. Federal support was also seen as being critical because representatives from the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) who were coordinating the American WNS 
management plan informed the group of their organization’s desire for a Canadian federal 
counterpart with whom they could harmonize international approaches to WNS management 
(Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2010c). It should be noted that research 
biologists on staff at Canadian Wildlife Services and Environment Canada did continue to 
participate in the WNS Management Group despite the limited resources the department was 
able to provide. 
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Upon receiving a draft version of the U.S. WNS management plan in late 2010, the 
Canadian WNS Management Group felt it was best to model their own efforts on their American 
colleagues’ work and develop a Canadian version of the plan (Interagency White Nose 
Syndrome Committee, 2011). The U.S. network had been developing policy responses and 
conducting research since 2008; as such, they were a valuable resource for the Canadian 
network. The U.S. plan also nodded towards the challenge of engaging stakeholders in a federal 
structure of wildlife disease management. The USFWS only has jurisdiction on federal lands but 
included a number of state and tribal representatives in its management plan working group (U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011). The plan authors acknowledge that states are under no 
requirement to follow this plan but state that “highly coordinated effort is required to effectively 
manage WNS and conserve species of bats” (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011, p. 4). 
The Canadian WNS Management Group requested the authority to develop the White 
nose syndrome management plan under the authority of the Canadian Wildlife Directors 
Committee. The CWDC agreed to this arrangement (contingent on the content of the final draft), 
and required adequate representation on the management plan working group from the four 
affected provinces: Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia (by 2011 WNS had 
spread to New Brunswick and Nova Scotia). The CWDC also formally approved the Canadian 
Wildlife Health Cooperative as the coordinating agency (to give administrative and 
organizational support to the network) (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2011). 
According to the meeting minutes the immediate goal was to alter the U.S. plan to “cover the full 
spectrum of management concerns in Canada” by December 2011 (Interagency White Nose 
Syndrome Committee, 2011, p. 2). The initial draft was written by September 2011 and 
submitted to the full WNS management group for comment.  
The WNS Management Plan laid out six areas of concern including Communications and 
Outreach; Data and Technical Information Management; Diagnostics; Disease Surveillance; 
Epidemiology and Ecology Research; and Conservation and Recovery of Affected Species. Each 
area contained several goals and under each goal a number of action items to complete in order 
to achieve these goals (Management Plan Drafting Subcommittee, 2012). These areas of concern 
would then form the basis of an action plan developed in consultation with WNS U.S. 
counterparts. According to an email from the CWHC’s Executive Director dated December 7, 
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2011, the action plans would assign tasks; indicate potential funding sources and responsibility to 
working groups to achieve the management plan’s goals for each area of concern.  
The majority of the goals of the management plan focused on capacity-building, 
information-sharing and closing the knowledge gap associated with containing the threat of 
White nose syndrome. The plan covered both the technical side including: developing 
standardized practices for diagnostic and decontamination and coordinating research efforts; as 
well as the communication side: including informing the public of both the value of bats and the 
threat of disease, raising awareness within the environmental community, media and government 
as well as developing productive working relationships with the recreational caver communities 
across Canada (Management Plan Drafting Subcommittee, 2012). What the Canadian plan did 
not include was a section on ‘Disease Management’. The U.S. WNS management plan did 
contain one but the Canadian counterparts suggested that there was a limitation to what would be 
achievable in this area and they prioritized prevention given their resource limitations. It was 
noted that any potential avenues that were developed to help mitigate the disease would be 
included in the action plans for achieving the plan’s objectives as they were developed 
(Management Plan Drafting Subcommittee, 2012, p. 2).   
A section of the WNS management plan on the legal framework of the network’s 
collaborative work suggests that there were a variety of factors, including the migratory nature of 
bats, the toxic nature of the P. destrucans fungus and potential change in bats’ conservation 
status that could shift jurisdiction for bats and WNS entirely to the federal government. There 
was also an acknowledgement in the plan that there were limited funds available, particularly no 
existing federal funding, to coordinate and undertake a serious policy response to the disease 
(Management Plan Drafting Subcommittee, 2012). 
Given the experience of the wildlife health network’s interaction with the federal 
government dealing with Chronic wasting disease and other diseases, the network was seemingly 
aware of a significant barrier: their need for federal support (both financial and legal) and the 
lack of forthcoming support from Environment Canada. The response of the network was 
twofold: they sought to develop capacity and knowledge through the provincial and non-
governmental partners already committed to the project and they approached existing federal 
government programs to gain either financial or legal support for the WNS management plan.  
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The Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative, on behalf of the network, made applications 
to the federal Invasive Alien Species Partnership Program (IASPP) and Environment Canada to 
fund research and network coordination. As well, requests were made to the Committee on the 
Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC) to conduct an emergency status 
assessment on the three species of bats most threatened by WNS in Canada. An assessment must 
be conducted by COSEWIC prior to making a recommendation for listing a species on the 
Species-at-Risk registry. The federal Minister of Environment has final approval on the listing. If 
approved, a Species-at-Risk designation requires a federally funded and implemented recovery 
plan to rehabilitate the ailing species and possibly the compromised lands or waters threatening 
the species. Having bats designated as ‘Endangered’ could open opportunities for federal 
support, however; there are limitations if a species is not listed as migratory: only animals on 
federal lands/water would be covered (Species at Risk Public Registry, 2015). 
By early 2012, the Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee had received the final draft of 
the White nose syndrome management plan from the WNS Management Plan Drafting 
subcommittee of the network and formally endorsed it as an appropriate course of action. They 
were unable to offer any finances to assist with coordination or implementation of the 
management plan, noting that funding “will have to come from the usual channel [sic] of agency 
budgets and priorities” (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2012a, p. 3). The 
CWDC also indicated that a decision to place bats on the Species at Risk registry could bring a 
change of funding priorities within their committee. 
 Attempts to engage the federal government in the WNS management plan were met with 
a number of roadblocks. Within months of submitting an application to the IASPP, Environment 
Canada announced the program was being discontinued as part of a budget reduction strategy 
within the government (Environment Canada, 2012b). After receiving requests in October 2011, 
COSEWIC conducted an emergency assessment of little brown myotis, tri-colored bat and 
northern myotis, the three bats affected by WNS in Canada (Committee on the Status of 
Endangered Wildlife in Canada, 2012). In February 2012, COSEWIC recommended to the 
federal government that the bats should be listed as ‘Endangered’ on the Species-at-Risk registry 
(Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada, 2014). Despite this 
recommendation, no response was received from the Minister of Environment until three years 
later, when the bats were finally listed as endangered (Species at Risk Public Registry, 2015). 
 63 
 
This delay created uncertainty for the network and the CWDC and allowed the disease to 
continue to spread to new areas in eastern Canada without significant intervention. A small 
contribution was made by Environment Canada in late 2012 of $50,000 for the CWHC to 
conduct surveillance on the spread of the disease (Environment Canada, 2013). 
In order to move forward with the WNS management plan and the attempt to engage 
decision makers in various levels of government, a decision was made to hold a national 
workshop on WNS in Ottawa in conjunction with the Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee’s 
fall meeting in October 2012. Members of the CWDC agreed to meet with the WNS group to be 
briefed on the ongoing disease threat, on the current planning and the need for action. According 
to an email from the CWHC’s Executive Director dated September 19, 2012, the CWDC 
subcommittee specifically requested information from the U.S. WNS Coordinator regarding the 
management process of the stakeholders in the U.S., the conflicts or challenges that arose and 
how regions were able to cope and respond when WNS was discovered in their area. 
 A number of important developments resulted from the meetings and workshops held by 
the WNS Management Group. The first of these was the participation of the Canadian Wildlife 
Federation (CWF) as a financial sponsor of this event. CWF had previously funded an expert 
panel on Chronic wasting disease (CWD) and participated on the CWD stakeholder committee. 
An email from the CWHC’s Executive Director and to network members dated September 13, 
2012 shows that a number of participants did not have funding available through their home 
agencies or organizations and were able to attend because of CWF’s support. CWF then became 
an active participant in the WNS management plan by supporting and coordinating outreach 
activities and citizen science programs that raise awareness of WNS and bat health issues 
(Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2013a). 
Additionally, the participants of the network, including biologists and staffers from 
provincial governments, the Canadian Wildlife Service, members of the Canadian Wildlife 
Health Cooperative and academics, were able to use the workshops to expand the management 
plan goals into action plans (Population Monitoring; Surveillance & Diagnosis; Mitigation; Data 
Management; and Communication & Outreach). From the creation of these action plans, the 
working groups responsible for each area were able to identify what resources (financial, legal, 
knowledge, time, etc.) were needed to implement the plan. The working groups were also able to 
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connect with the U.S. working groups working in the same area and share information or 
strategy for implementing the plans.  
The CWDC subcommittee working on WNS also provided their recommendations, in a 
November 8, 2012 email sent by the Saskatchewan provincial member of the committee, to the 
broader CWDC group regarding the October 2012 meeting. In this document the subcommittee 
made two recommendations: first that a WNS Coordinator should be hired to coordinate 
activities for the Canadian WNS management plan. It was suggesting the Canadian Wildlife 
Health Cooperative would be an ideal place to house the coordinator, given the organization’s 
history with coordinating multi-level wildlife health plans. Secondly, they suggested “funding to 
support WNS coordination and related national-scale activities (e.g., surveillance, monitoring, 
research, communication) would be most effective if resources were combined from all affected 
jurisdictions” given the scope of the disease and the potential impact of federal legislation. This 
would appear to be a nod to the network’s desire to have greater federal involvement (both 
funding and authority), as the general assumption held by various stakeholders was that bats 
would be declared a federal endangered species at any moment (Wildlife Disease Subcommittee, 
2012). 
While there was no immediate change in the level of assistance from the federal 
government, according to an email sent by the CWHC’s Executive Director on November 28, 
2012, a request was made by an officer in the Canadian Wildlife Service to provide multi-year 
funding to CWHC for a coordinator position as Environment Canada/CWS’ contribution to 
fighting WNS. The suggestion from the officer was that a multi-year commitment would not 
only support surveillance and administrative support but that it could encourage matching funds 
from other jurisdictions (despite existing commitments at the provincial level).  
 The next step for the WNS network was the creation and formalization of the technical 
working groups who would carry out the action plans. Beginning in March 2013 groups were 
struck in the following areas: Population Monitoring; Surveillance & Diagnosis; Mitigation; 
Data Management; and Communication & Outreach. These technical working groups act as 
subcommittees to what was now called the ‘Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee’ 
(formerly the WNS Management Group), which by this point had grown to more than 50 
members (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2013b). At least one member of each 
working group also holds membership in the appropriate U.S Action Plan group to ensure 
 65 
 
continuity between the countries’ activities. The Executive Director of CWHC also joined on the 
U.S. WNS Steering Committee, the U.S. WNS coordinator holds a seat on the Canadian Inter-
agency WNS Committee and the Canadian WNS Coordinator sits on all technical working 
groups as part of their duties. 
In a report to the CWDC seeking their formal approval of the working groups and the 
hiring of a WNS coordinator, the network laid out their five key priorities based on both urgency 
and feasibility. These goals include establishing a coordinator for the Canadian management 
plan, creating a national bat population monitoring plan, creating a national plan for WNS 
surveillance, developing a mitigation strategy and advocating for research and research funding 
focused on White nose syndrome and P. destructans (Interagency White Nose Syndrome 
Committee, 2013c).  
The CWDC’s approval was a mere formality as the wheels were already in motion with a 
funding announcement from Environment Canada in early April 2013. The CWHC was given 
$82,500 per year over four years to support White nose syndrome management across Canada. 
The press release from the federal government suggested “[n]ational coordination will ensure 
efficient and effective use of resources in areas such as disease surveillance, reducing rates of 
transmission, public communication, and research into appropriate conservation actions, as well 
as facilitating information exchange with similar interests in the United States” (Environment 
Canada, 2013). This funding has been allocated entirely to fund a coordinator position within the 
Atlantic Canada branch of CWHC. 
In the past three years, the technical working group have developed decontamination 
protocols for bat hibernacula, established standardizations for testing for WNS, authored a 
Western Canada WNS transmission prevention guide and launched a citizen science program for 
daytime flying bats with the assistance of the Canadian Wildlife Federation (Canadian Wildlife 
Federation, 2013). Members of the Interagency WNS Committee have also been instrumental in 
furthering scientific knowledge of P. destructans’ pathology in bats and successfully secured a 
second emergency assessment from COSEWIC on the status of little brown myotis, tri-colored 
bat and northern myotis (Species at Risk Public Registry, 2015). 
Since its discovery in southern Ontario and Quebec in 2010, White nose syndrome has 
forged a northern and westward expansion in Canada. The disease is almost at the Manitoba-
Ontario border and has been confirmed as far east as Cape Breton (Canadian Wildlife Health 
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Cooperative, 2015b). The impact of the disease has been catastrophic in certain areas of the 
Maritimes, with mortality reaching 99% (New Brunswick Department of Natural Resources, 
2013). While it is likely the WNS management plan is helping to reduce the spread of P. 
destructans by humans, the migratory nature of bats and the emerging nature of the fungus has 
complicated mitigation. Add to this the limited resources allocated to wildlife health and the 
Canada WNS network continues to work at addressing problems beyond its capacity, relying 
heavily on a small group of individuals highly committed to the problem. 
Two developments in 2015 have provided hope to the wildlife sector regarding White 
nose syndrome. In May 2015, the Canadian government finally added three species of bats to the 
Species at Risk registry, providing the possibility that there will be more federal intervention as a 
listing requires a species recovery plan to be developed and implemented in line with the Species 
at Risk Act (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2014). As well, researchers from the 
University of California at Santa Cruz have identified a bacterium present in some bats that 
inhibits the growth of P. destructans. This development will potentially lead to a vaccine that can 
limit the destruction WNS has wrought on North America’s bat populations (Hoyt et al., 2015). 
5.3 Network resilience 
 
While there has yet to be a key breakthrough of support for the work of the Interagency 
WNS Committee, there have been small victories punctuating the timeline of the network’s 
activities. The severity of the threat of White nose syndrome and the catastrophic decline in bat 
populations that have already occurred have been communicated to decision makers in provincial 
and federal governments. Three species of bats have been added to the endangered species 
register by the Canadian government, as well as in all the affected provinces in eastern Canada 
(Species at Risk Public Register, 2015). The WNS network received formal approval for their 
national White nose syndrome management plan and action plans by the Canadian Wildlife 
Directors Committee, as well as funding for a national coordinator from Environment Canada 
through 2018. The network was also able to forge connections with U.S. counterparts, leading 
academics and non-governmental environment advocates to strengthen their knowledge base and 
ability to communicate with the public. 
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In order to investigate the network’s resilience in tackling White nose syndrome the three 
major determinants of resilience will be examined: slack in resources, adaptive capacity and 
situation awareness. This will provide the opportunity to address how resilience in both attitude 
and action was displayed by the network between 2010 and 2015, as well as how the failure to 
act or adapt led to network fragility at times.  
5.3.1 Slack in resources 
 
 As previously discussed, slack in resources is crucial to network resilience by allowing 
the network to have the flexibility of when to expend resources, when to save resources in order 
to tackle threats and the capacity to reconfigure resources in order to take advantage of new 
opportunities. These resources come in a number of forms including financial, cognitive and 
social. 
 In the case of the Interagency WNS Committee (and its earlier incarnations), financial 
resources proved to be a stumbling block throughout the development and implementation of the 
WNS Management Plan. The initial group of biologists who began the collaboration to address 
WNS knew that bats were unlikely to attract much attention as the value of bats was generally 
underestimated; they were considered a non-economically viable animal and this disease did not 
appear to be a threat to humans, which lowered any perceived sense of urgency (Personal 
Communication with F.A. Leighton). There was also awareness very early on from network 
participants within the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) that the federal government would be 
unlikely to participate in a significant way as funding and jobs at Environment Canada and CWS 
had recently been cut (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2010c). As well, the only 
federal funding program that was initially available to the group, the Invasive Alien Species 
Partnership Program (IASPP) was closed in 2012 in another round of budget cuts at Environment 
Canada (Environment Canada, 2012a).  
 What the network lacked in financial resources, they made up for in social resources. 
According to an email sent by a provincial biologist dated September 1, 2010, the initial 
teleconferences that were planned when WNS first discovered in Canada hosted more than 40 
individuals from governments and universities, as well as the Canadian Wildlife Health 
Cooperative’s offices across Canada. Records of meetings show that there were participants from 
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every province and territory present by the network’s third meeting and by the time the formal 
Interagency WNS Committee was christened there were over 50 participants (Interagency White 
Nose Syndrome Committee, 2010c).  
One of the key values of this level of network participation (or the slack in social 
resources) was that there were enough individuals to assist with coordination and execution of 
the WNS action plans without overburdening the core members. As well, it indicates the indirect 
levels of funding and support being provided to the network. The two main employers of 
network members are universities and governments. The ability of these individuals to 
participate in meetings, planning and research represents the tacit agreement of their employers 
(in the case of government) or the freedom their positions afford to pursue what they consider to 
be valuable research endeavours (in the case of the academics). This is not to suggest that there is 
an unlimited availability of research and surveillance at the disposal of the network. The 
government employees in the network invariably have other diseases and threats that they are 
responsible for reporting on to their departments and there is only so much that can be done 
without financial and political support. 
In this case, there were also times where the presence of  certain social resources were 
able to assist in generating financial resources. Members of the Interagency WNS Committee 
were policy staff with Canadian Wildlife Services who were able to advocate strongly to 
Environment Canada to fund a WNS Coordinator. A member of the Canadian Wildlife Directors 
also advocated on behalf of the network to their committee and the CWHC had previously 
received contracts with Environment Canada for disease surveillance on WNS and other disease. 
All of these relationships provided pathways for advocacy that resulted in funding from 
Environment Canada for national coordination of White nose syndrome. 
There is no real evidence of financial contingency plans, but there is also no evidence of 
the network committing to financial obligations they could not fulfil. As we will see in the 
sections on adaptive capacity and situation awareness,  most network members understand that 
they are at a disadvantaged position financially and that in order to make the most of the limited 
resources being collaborative and adaptable is key (Interagency White Nose Syndrome 
Committee, 2013a).  
Cognitive, social and financial resources have all been sought through partnerships 
network members have with various communities. The most significant partnership that the 
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Interagency WNS Committee has developed is with their U.S. counterparts who developed and 
implemented the U.S. WNS Management Plan, including Jeremy Coleman, the WNS 
Coordinator for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2011). The 
U.S. group began working on a WNS mitigation plan three years earlier than the Canadian 
network and have access to more researchers and experts. According to an email from the 
CWHC’s Executive Director to a member of the wildlife directors committee, dated June 8, 
2012, rather than develop an entirely new management plan the Canadian WNS network adapted 
the U.S. WNS Management Plan, recognizing their U.S. colleagues had valuable experience 
facing the disease that they did not. Another valuable partnership was developed in 2013 with the 
Canadian Wildlife Federation. The CWF and the WNS network partnered to develop a citizen 
science program, using the CWF’s expertise at public outreach and education to provide a low 
cost surveillance program to alert the network to the presence of daytime flying bats (a sign of a 
WNS-type disturbance) (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2013c). 
The importance of slack in resources is noticeable throughout the timeline of WNS 
management. The continuing theme of a lack of financial resources provided a motivation to 
develop specific approaches that would require action from the federal government if they were 
to be successful such as a Species at Risk designation. The increase in cognitive and social 
resources allowed the network to remain in action. The continual discovery of new information 
in the management of WNS, the ability to close knowledge gaps and work with new partners 
provided motivation to continue.  
5.3.2 Adaptive Capacity 
 
 The second determinant of the network resilience model is adaptive capacity. Adaptive 
capacity is the willingness to adjust behaviours and practices to meet new challenges as they 
arise. Networks with adaptive capacity will make timely and appropriate decisions when facing 
stress because they have a culture that is sufficiently flexible and open to change. 
 As many of the participants in the WNS network were also involved in the Chronic 
wasting disease (CWD) case, including the CWHC as the coordinating organization, there are 
certainly similarities in the attitudes and behaviours of network participants in the two cases. The 
previously discussed commitment to adaptive management and scientific inquiry is present in the 
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WNS case as well. Even less was known about the pathology of WNS in 2010 when the network 
began its work than was known about CWD, requiring much input from researchers and a true 
need for best practices for disease mitigation. An email from a veterinary pathology professor 
working with the network to a colleague in New Brunswick dated September 29, 2011 indicated 
that the network’s decision to partner with the U.S. WNS group was primarily out of a desire to 
defer to those working on the problem who were farther along in understanding how to slow 
down the spread of WNS, if not stop it. According to the CWHC’s Executive Director in an 
email dated June 8, 2012: “[t]hinking about all aspects of management is quite advanced in the 
US and so we can learn much by joining their teams and planning approaches”. 
Beyond this important partnership, the foundational activities of the network focused on 
identifying and closing knowledge gaps. This included identifying maternal roosts and 
hibernation sites across Canada as well as identifying which researchers in Canada had 
knowledge of pathophysiology in bats, migration patterns, and surveillance practices that could 
be brought into the fold on the WNS work in Canada (Interagency White Nose Syndrome 
Committee, 2010b). This information seeking behaviour continued, as the publication of the 
WNS Western Transmission Prevention Plan in June 2014 indicated the WNS mitigation 
working group’s intention to learn as much about bat habitats in Western Canada as possible in 
order to facilitate recovery and stop WNS’s spread across Canada (Canadian Wildlife Health 
Cooperative, 2014). 
 There is a second similarity to the Chronic wasting disease network case, which is how 
the network took a rather traditional approach to attempting to secure the support of political 
decision makers. There was a desire to secure both funds and leadership from the federal 
government as the disease was quickly spreading across provincial borders. Having been told 
there were no federal funds in place or desire to lead the mitigation effort, the network took the 
next available avenue to secure the support (if unwilling) of the Canadian government by 
requesting an emergency evaluation of three bat species under the Species at Risk Act. In an 
email from a network member on staff at the Canada Wildlife Service to the Executive Director 
of the CWHC dated July 11, 2011, advocating for protected status is seen as a strategy that could 
be successful as it would require a financial commitment to protect and repopulate the affected 
bat species despite the budget reductions underway at Environment Canada.  
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 In some ways this approach shows that the network members who were involved in both 
cases (as well as mitigation plans for West Nile Virus and Avian Influenza) have learned to be 
savvier in their attempts to secure financing for their activities. While the CWD network 
attempted to build a federal/provincial/territorial agreement on wildlife disease strategy that 
relied on interest and collaboration between a variety of stakeholders, the WNS group used a 
regulatory program that requires a formal government response when wildlife is threated with 
extirpation. The Minister could either refuse to list bats as endangered, despite overwhelming 
scientific evidence, or the bats would be listed and a mandatory recovery plan would need to be 
formulated and funded.  
 What the network did not expect was that there would be no response from the federal 
government for more than three years after an emergency assessment was carried out in late 
2011. There are references to a potential SARA listing throughout the meetings and the 
management documents written by the network (Management Plan Drafting Subcommittee, 
2012). It obviously was a source of hope and the group even planned how listing the animals as 
endangered would affect their ability to work (including surveillance on federal lands and 
transporting specimens) (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2012b). The fact that 
the network did not falter or slow down its operations in light of this challenge speaks to their 
impression of the magnitude of the disease threat and knowledge that a strong case for 
government intervention from a wildlife management perspective does not necessarily equate to 
government action. 
 After the disappointments of both the Invasive Alien Species Partnership Program being 
shut down and Environment Canada not responding the COSEWIC recommendation that little 
brown myotis, tri-colored bat and northern myotis be listed as endangered federally, the network 
continued pursuing how to put their WNS management plan into action. Advocating for the 
network, the Canadian Wildlife Directors Committee (CWDC) Secretariat released a statement 
and a briefing note advocating funding a national WNS coordinator to be placed in the CWHC 
via an email sent November 8, 2012 to all the Committee members, which includes directors and 
Deputy Ministers of wildlife agencies and departments across the country. Network members in 
the Canadian Wildlife Service advocated to their director to fund the coordinator position.  
While waiting for responses from various agencies and departments, the Interagency 
WNS Committee dedicated itself to fighting WNS despite their financial limitations, 
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acknowledging that the “nimble and collaborative structure of committees and responsibilities 
proposed is appropriate to the Canadian reality in which there is no central authority or source of 
funds for WNS responses” (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2013a). The decision 
to pursue implementation and action when the emergency Species at Risk listing fell through led 
to the network ultimately understanding that their lack of direct government oversight allowed 
them to make decisions quicker than other committees and work directly with U.S. partners 
without political interference (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2013b). 
 The WNS network has not been able to adapt perfectly across the board, as they are 
limited by structural boundaries of cross-provincial wildlife management within a federal 
system. The five affected provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward 
Island and Quebec) have all developed surveillance and mitigation strategies in line with the 
WNS Management Plan, as members of the network work for each of the provinces (along with 
work done by CWHC’s Atlantic office located at the Atlantic Veterinary College in PEI where 
the WNS national coordinator is based). Despite struggles of coordination and limited financial 
resources, they have shown a level of tenacity and innovation that was not present in the Chronic 
wasting disease case. 
5.3.3 Situation Awareness 
 
 The final feature that contributes to network resilience is situation awareness: a measure 
of how well the network understands its environment (McManus, Seville, Brunsdon & Vargo, 
2007). The suggestion in the literature is that higher levels of situation awareness reduce a 
network’s liability when facing risk as they have planned for potential crisis scenarios and have a 
keen awareness of the world they operate in (Bakker, Raab & Milward, 2012). 
The WNS network in Canada has shown a calculated response to a potentially 
catastrophic ecological event. From the earliest meetings of the group, there was an awareness of 
the high levels of mortality associated with the fungus and knowledge of how little was known 
about the disease (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2010a). The history of 
government approaches to dealing with wildlife disease was also well known within the group; 
giving the planning activities a less than hopeful tone. In an email dated June 8, 2012 to a 
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CWDC member, the CWHC’s Executive Director noted the requirements of tackling the 
situation in Canada:  
It has devastated bat populations such that some of the most abundant mammals in North 
America in 2006 and now threatened with extinction. As yet, there is no evidence of 
recovery. A wide range of US federal and state agencies, research scientists and NGOs are 
becoming highly coordinated in rolling out management actions and research priorities. My 
understanding is that the annual new money investment in WNS by the US federal 
government was $4M last year and will be as much or more (up to $8M) in the coming 
year… There also has been considerable diversion of people and funds within agencies 
toward WNS management. A parallel program on a Canadian scale would require on the 
order of $400K to $800K in new money plus staff and resource diversions to achieve 
equivalent actions on this side of the border.  
 
The network’s experience and expertise of wildlife disease and government institutions in 
place to mitigate wildlife disease made two opposing facts quite clear: White nose syndrome is a 
catastrophic threat to ecological health in North America and wildlife disease threats, particularly 
those that do not threaten humans or economic wellbeing, are very low on the list of priorities to 
political and bureaucratic leaders.  
These conflicting realities dominated the network’s ‘operating context’. Throughout the 
network’s communications, both private and public, there are indications that members are 
acutely aware of the devastating impact WNS is having on bats. All versions of the management 
plan seek to inform the reader of the levels of mortality and the “increasing uncertainty as to 
what, if any, measures can be taken to alter the prevalence, impact or spread of WNS” 
(Management Plan Drafting Subcommittee, 2012, p. 1). The wording in the management plan 
and other documents sent to potential funders strongly suggests awareness that the best that can 
be achieved may be delaying the spread of the disease (Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative, 
2014).  
The knowledge that there are often very few resources available to address the effects of 
WNS stems from the experience the network members have working on other diseases and crises 
for wildlife overtime, including Chronic wasting disease. There are acknowledgements on 
multiple occasions that despite the ‘support’ of authority figures, few resources are forthcoming, 
as seen in an email, dated October 5, 2012 from the CWHC’s Executive Director to a network 
member working with Canada Wildlife Service stating: “It may be up to the participants to drive 
the actions, hopefully with the blessing of the CWDC and whatever support they can provide”.  
These two considerations, the severity of the threat and the lack of resources, appear to 
weigh heavily on the network’s planning and actions throughout. The way the group formulated 
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their action appears to be an attempt to mitigate these problems. The Interagency WNS 
Committee pared down the management response to what was necessary and feasible. They 
partnered with groups that had more resources, used legislative means to garner support and 
developed alternatives while waiting on authorities to act. Evidence of a number of features of 
situation awareness can be seen in these actions including: awareness of the ramifications of their 
own actions; awareness of stakeholder expectations; identification of potentials for failure as 
well as learning from past errors. 
Authoring a management plan and action plans that focused on the most pressing 
concerns allowed the Interagency WNS Committee to attend to the critical items needed to slow 
the spread of WNS in Canada. A decision to omit ‘Disease Management’ from the management 
plan is one indicator that the group knew its limitations (Management Plan Drafting 
Subcommittee, 2012). Resources were instead invested in decontamination protocols to limit the 
human-led spread of the disease and surveillance to identify maternal colonies and hibernacula in 
threatened areas (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2013b.).  
Another major indication of the network’s awareness of its structural constraints was the 
decision to partner with groups that have more resources, particularly their U.S. counterparts. As 
previously discussed, the network decided that there was no need to recreate work that was 
already happening in the U.S. when it would apply to the Canadian context. This led to the 
Interagency WNS Committee adapting the U.S. Management Plan directly for the Canadian 
context. Having the high levels of coordination between the two countries would allow the 
Canadian network to access the latest information on WNS management and adapt it as 
necessary without starting from scratch. 
In identifying potential opportunities for action, the decision to apply for federal Species 
at Risk status for the three species of bats primarily affected by White nose syndrome was not 
only a well-informed choice but also a seemingly strategic move to garner more resources and 
legislative clout. Evidence of this is seen in minutes from a network teleconference in which 
CWDC members indicate that a recommendation that bats be put on the Species at Risk registry 
would most likely shift priorities and funding commitments in the CWDC and Environment 
Canada (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2012a). We also see this information 
being taken on board in an email from the CWHC’s Executive Director to a network member: 
“COSEWIC recommendations, slowly growing public awareness and alarm and pressure from 
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US programs… all may push Canadian agencies toward giving WNS more management 
attention”. A further consideration was the desire of the U.S. agency overseeing WNS to have a 
federal counterpart in Canada (Interagency White Nose Syndrome Committee, 2010c).  
Upon realizing that a COSEWIC recommendation was not going to result in any 
immediate action by the federal government, the Interagency WNS Committee members made 
the decision to continue their work as planned rather than delaying while waiting for a response. 
Whether this is due to the severity of the threat or because they had learned from previous 
experience, where a slowdown in action resulted in a loss of momentum, is unknown. 
Recognizing that relying on one primary source of funding and authority was a past mistake, and 
attempting to diversify approaches as well as continuing work while awaiting responses shows 
an awareness of past failure and an attempt to mitigate future failure. 
The White nose syndrome case appears to present a network that has shown more 
resilience than it did during the Chronic wasting disease case, as the WNS network is still 
actively collaborating on implementing the management plan for WNS. The identification of 
bacteria in bats that can inhibit P. destructans provides hope that a treatment method will be 
available in North America in the near future (Hoyt et al., 2015). In the meantime, the 
Interagency WNS Committee appears to have the means, however limited, to continue their 
work as they have actively identified the barriers to success and formulated strategies to navigate 
the limitations of their network arrangements. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has examined how new governance arrangements in Canada have formed to 
tackle emerging wildlife disease epidemics. The resiliency of the network that developed to 
address these diseases has been of key interest. The concept of resiliency, stemming from 
positive organizational scholarship, relates to the network’s ability to make and to continue 
making positive adjustments in performance in the face of challenges in order to emerge more 
resourceful and better equipped for future challenges (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). Higher levels of 
resilience are characterized by strong evidence of adaptive capacity, situation awareness and 
slack in resources. By examining the activities of the network while dealing with two cases of 
disease outbreak (Chronic wasting disease and White nose syndrome), I have been able to 
identify attitudes and actions that suggest the network has the capacity to make positive 
adjustment. The ability to operationalize these attitudes and actions into productive behaviour 
that allows the network to overcome obstacles, however, appears to be uneven. 
Governance networks have received attention and been the subject of much debate, as 
complex problems emerge that single agencies are unable to address on their own. One element 
of governance network activity that has received limited attention is what drives the ability to 
sustain network activities. Resilience ought to be a key issue in the life of a network, as higher 
levels of resilience is assumed to reduce the chances of network failure. Network failure should 
be of primary concern for any government that relies heavily on networked arrangements to 
provide services.  Brian W. Head (2008) suggests that assessing network effectiveness based on 
outcomes is problematic because a useful pattern of outcomes may take years to materialize and 
the causal factors at play in complex policy areas may make judging the impact of the network 
impossible. Head suggests that network evaluation must navigate these evaluative limitations in 
an attempt to assess both whether there is the sustainability of good processes in play and if the 
desired (feasible and attainable) outcomes have been achieved. Focusing on resilience can be 
seen primarily as developing the sustainability of good processes and ensuring network members 
are equipped to make sound decisions. This practice will contribute to both successful policy 
 77 
 
development and the sustainability of the network’s activities despite the external challenges in 
the political environment. 
The wildlife health network in Canada has proven itself a foundational piece of the 
animal health infrastructure in Canada. Without the collaborative work the network conducts, 
there would be very little state-sponsored capacity for veterinary health in Canada outside of 
livestock monitoring. The collaborative efforts of the network have produced national disease 
management programs and disease surveillance projects well beyond the capacity of a single 
province’s wildlife management resources. 
The path to developing, coordinating and implementing a policy response to outbreaks of 
emerging diseases is fraught with challenges, particularly the securing of funding and approval 
from various levels of government. In the face of a regulatory deficit in wildlife health in 
Canada, individuals with expertise in wildlife health from provincial natural resources 
departments, federal environment agencies and academic institutions have developed an ad hoc 
governance network to tackle wildlife disease epidemics and the bureaucratic blockages 
impeding their success (Farnese, 2014).   
Examining the network’s capacity for resilience has shed light on both the strengths and 
weaknesses of the network, provided potential areas for improvement and also produced a first 
step towards building a model of governance network resilience. Exploring how the network 
managed policy responses to Chronic wasting disease and White nose syndrome has also shed 
light on the limits of comparison for the two case studies. As section 6.1 will discuss, the 
differences between the two diseases - specifically the participation of agricultural interests and 
the delayed onset of symptoms in the Chronic wasting disease - proved to be a more important 
variable than previously thought. This does not mean that resilience characteristics have no role 
to play in how the network handles its work, however, it is important to emphasize how the 
nature of these diseases can be significant constraints on action. We can and have speculated 
about how resilient capacity can increase the likelihood of successful policy outcomes but 
without a more extensive comparison, no definitive conclusions can be derived.  
 In investigating how the wildlife health network, coordinated by the Canadian Wildlife 
Health Cooperative (CWHC), functioned while facing the two cases of disease in wildlife, I was 
able to assess how successful the network was at achieving its goals in each case.  Even a brief 
glance at the evidence suggest that the network’s methods have been more successful at securing 
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the financial and political support required for the White nose syndrome (WNS) management 
plan than for the Chronic wasting disease (CWD) management plan. The Interagency WNS 
Committee is still active across the country and their efforts have continued to make gains 
towards eradicating WNS. The CWD Inter-agency Oversight Committee, on the other hand, 
stalled out in late 2008, regrouped for a period between 2010 and 2011 but has not been active 
since. The affected provinces have suspended culling programs and the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency has categorized those areas as ‘Endemic’, suggesting the disease is now a part 
of the ecosystem (Cotter, 2013).  
 What is less apparent without a deeper exploration of the network’s behaviour and 
methods is why attempts to mitigate CWD proved ineffective while many of the same players 
participated in the more successful Interagency WNS Committee just a few years later. I argue 
that in the WNS case, the network displayed more resilience to setbacks than it did when 
working on the CWD problem.  This conclusion is based on a deconstruction of the network’s 
behaviour and interactions with stakeholders into the component elements theorized to be 
reliable indicators of resilience in organizations. Table 6-1 provides a snapshot of the differences 
between the two cases. The first seven categories are derived from the governance network 
resilience model in Chapter 3 and the remaining four categories are external factors, which 
appear to have influenced the actions of the network or relevant stakeholders. 
The similarities seen between the two cases include network behaviour that is 
information seeking and preoccupied with failure, both characteristics that are indicators of 
willingness to explore new approaches and to plan for setbacks in a way that should contribute to 
higher levels of resilience (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). In both cases the network’s activities and 
outcomes were shaped by a lack of financial or regulatory support from the federal government 
as well as the non-zoonotic nature of the diseases. That neither disease affected humans reduced 
the urgency of mitigating the effects on the animal population.  
 The areas of difference between the two cases include financial, relational and cognitive 
slack: all important for resilience because they provide the network with the freedom to 
reconfigure resources as needed, to stave off burn out by network members and to put new 
information to use. The CWD case resulted in an exhaustion of financial and relational slack as 
funds and political support ran out. The research conducted on the disease did not provide new 
avenues for disease management until the network had already ceased working on the issue. In 
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this case, the network focused almost exclusively on securing approval for a national CWD 
management plan, an ambitious, proactive disease mitigation strategy. This approach ultimately 
proved unsuccessful and left the network with limited options. The strong start to the network’s 
work petered out over time, as did research funding and attention to prion diseases.  
 
Table 6-1. Network resilience by characteristic  
 
 
The White nose syndrome (WNS) case, on the other hand, saw a gain in financial slack as 
the network was able to secure funding from Environment Canada for a national WNS 
coordinator. The network benefitted from support from the American WNS coordinator, 
employed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, as well as from academics who continued to 
make scientific discoveries about the disease across North America. The Interagency WNS 
Committee was able to muster their resources and their knowledge of the government 
stakeholder’s priorities as well as a measure of adaptive capacity (which was not seen in the 
CWD case) to maintain the high level of resiliency needed to eradicate WNS in Canada over 
many years. In particular, the network’s decision to take a multipronged approach in tackling 
WNS resulted in much needed financial and social resources from the federal government that 
was essential to support the ongoing work. The network was able to formulate and implement 
management plans for various aspects of the disease, to incorporate new scientific information as 
it was discovered and ultimately to target the federal government on a number of fronts to secure 
a financial commitment and a Species at Risk listing for endangered bats.  
6.1 Overall ability to manage disease is heavily dependent on disease characteristics  
 
A key difference in the cases illustrated in Table 6-1 relates to disease progression. 
Chronic wasting disease has an extended incubation period; animals can be infected with the 
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disease for more than a year before symptoms present (Bollinger et al., 2004). White nose 
syndrome, on the other hand, is fast moving, killing bats in a matter of months, not years. This 
disease specific characteristic, and a number of others such as pathogen complexity, the effect on 
wild animals and livestock, the speed and method of transmission, coloured the network’s ability 
to respond, in particular its potential for adaptive capacity. 
A resilient network should be able to adapt its planning and approaches to match its 
current circumstances; this is adaptive capacity. However, when tackling emerging diseases like 
CWD and WNS, the amount of information known to scientists and policy makers limit the 
available approaches. The speed and severity of WNS’s progress through the Northeastern 
United States caught the attention of veterinary biologists as well as the media (Munroe, 2012). 
The unknown nature of the disease was problematic, but the fact that the disease took hold of 
bats while they were hibernating allowed researchers to have ample access to samples and 
subjects for testing. The pattern of bats’ migratory routes allowed surveillance teams to identify 
hibernacula at risk, as well as develop decontamination protocols for cavers and miners who may 
be transmitting the disease. The disease itself and the mechanisms by which it kills bats were 
able to be identified in a matter of years. A vaccine against the fungus is currently being tested. 
 Chronic wasting disease exhibited several opposite characteristics: the disease has a 
slower progression, leaving a period of years before an infected animal is able to be identified. 
Cervids are migratory as well, but they do not hibernate. They are less accessible and evidence of 
disease is found only after they have been killed by hunters or found dead of CWD in nature. 
The disease itself was only determined to be a prion disease (caused by misfolded proteins in the 
brain) in 1979 after more than ten years of study (Goñi et al., 2015). There are no treatment 
options available, however a vaccine is being tested. Despite being present in North America for 
more than 40 years, CWD has proven challenging to control in both farmed animals and wildlife. 
Until a treatment or vaccine emerges, culling and environmental decontamination post-cull are 
the only way to destroy the disease. 
The lack of new knowledge about the disease was a particular challenge for the Chronic 
wasting disease (CWD) Interagency Oversight Committee. The ways in which prions emerge in 
the brain are unknown, as is the mechanism of transmission. The network gathered experts on 
prion diseases at the outset of their work to advise them on best practices for prion diseases. This 
information provided the basis for the management plan the network attempted to implement and 
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sell to governments. The plan may very well have been the best option to mitigate with the 
problem from a veterinary perspective but it was not politically feasible for agricultural interests 
(as culling farmed animals was the only eradication option) and was not supported by the federal 
government elected in 2006. There was no progress or improvement in the treatment or 
containment options for the disease over the years of network involvement and as such there was 
no new approach taken by the network. The inability to reframe the disease as a feasible 
management target seems to have been a fatal stumbling block for the network. 
In the more successful case of WNS, the network took multiple approaches to gain 
financial support and regulatory protection for bats, while waiting for action from the federal 
government. The speed of the disease progression, while devastating, provided the opportunity to 
have bats listed on the Species at Risk registry, which affords them protection and legally 
mandates a management plan to either curb the threat or repopulate the species. Partnerships 
with researchers and U.S. wildlife officials provided access to emerging research and 
management practices. These relationships provided the network with new information to hone 
their planning, in an effort to continually make positive adjustments. The network was able to 
sustain operations in the WNS case because they were able to adapt their methods to meet the 
changing political and regulatory landscape they were facing in a way that also tackled the type 
of problem the disease was creating. 
Given the outcomes of these cases, adaptive capacity appears to be limited by external 
factors to a greater degree than is typically acknowledged. The wildlife health network’s ability 
to adjust their approaches to meet new circumstances has been stifled by a lack of scientific 
information, economically feasible management approaches and coordinated authority between 
farmed animal and wildlife jurisdictions. In other cases, such as when dealing with WNS, these 
challenges were not present and better outcomes were witnessed.  
6.2 Experience increases situation awareness 
 
Using the network resilience model, we can identify which characteristics were lacking in 
the wildlife health network that led to less resilient behavior and a reduced ability to overcome 
stressors. What Table 6-1 does not immediately illustrate, but was apparent in the investigation 
of the two cases, is that resilient characteristics appear to strengthen as the network gains 
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experience. This is particularly apparent in the area of situation awareness, as awareness of 
stakeholder expectations and the ability to anticipate problems appear to increase with continued 
practice. 
Situation awareness is a measure of the network’s perception of their operating 
environment including their ability to identify and navigate opportunities, threats, limitations and 
the expectations of stakeholders. We are able to identify situation awareness through increased 
communication and coordination in anticipation of, or in reaction to, potential problems, as well 
as through awareness of the obligations and needs of stakeholders.  This set of characteristics 
encompasses an understanding of the network’s environment (and the players in this 
environment) gained from experience and also behavior that exploits this understanding for the 
network’s gain.  
In the two cases examined throughout this thesis, it appears that the experience and 
knowledge gained between the Chronic wasting disease (CWD) case and the White nose 
syndrome (WNS) case contributed to an increase of situation awareness and a subsequent 
increase in resilience. From the time the network began working on Chronic wasting disease 
until the emergence of White nose syndrome in Canada, there were a number of high profile 
wildlife and zoonotic disease issues in Canada; including SARS, West Nile virus and Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (such as H1N1). Many but not all members of the network were 
involved in all these cases and the coordinating agency of the network, the Canadian Wildlife 
Health Cooperative (CWHC), oversaw national surveillance programs for the latter two diseases 
as well as coordinating the policy recommendations of the network involved in CWD and WNS. 
CWHC staff also co-authored the National Wildlife Disease Strategy with members of the 
Canadian Wildlife Directors’ Committee.   
Between 2004 and 2010, the numbers of ongoing disease threats dealt with by members 
of the network appears to have led to an increased in political sophistication required to achieve 
their goals. We earlier assessed the network as having moderately strong levels of situation 
awareness because they understood the severity of the threats each disease held. There was 
appropriate knowledge of the political realities of funding non-zoonotic disease management 
plans, as well as awareness of potential struggle and failure throughout the formal and informal 
communications of the network. In the CWD case, this awareness did not translate to action to 
move the management plan forward or to address hesitancy on the part of the federal 
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government. Records of network meetings make it clear that the participants were realistic in 
their expectations; however, there was a lack of planning for alternate courses of actions. The 
network was passive and reactionary. 
The response was quite different when facing WNS. There was a change in attitude and 
action that seems to be the result of having failed and learned from that failure. There was no 
sense from the network that the magnitude of the disease threat would be enough to make the 
federal government intervene, as there was in the CWD case. Rather than simply presenting the 
facts of the case and the proposed management plan to the federal government and waiting for a 
response, during the WNS case the network adopted multiple approaches. It seems that the 
network’s awareness of the expectations (and limitations) of stakeholders and potential partners 
grew enough to understand how to force the hand of politicians and bureaucrats who had WNS 
low on their list of priorities. 
This result leads us to conclude that resilience can be enhanced as the network gains 
experience. It is not stated explicitly in the assumptions of the model but perhaps deserves to be. 
This outcome is in line with how psychologists theorize individuals’ resilience to shocks and 
stressors, which is as a function of experience and learning (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). 
Developing resilience, as the network resilience model illustrates, requires resource capacity to 
make positive changes as well as the ability to both identify what is a positive change and then to 
execute the change successfully. Underlying situation awareness and adaptive capacity is 
knowledge of the network’s environmental context and the insight of how to navigate it to 
achieve the positive change required. The only way, seemingly, to build this intelligence is 
through experience.  For a network this then requires both individual and collective experiences 
from which the lessons can be learned, successes can be integrated into future behavior and 
failures can be anticipated. The actions taken in the WNS case show the integration of 
knowledge culled from past experience with the federal government with actions designed to 
bypass the settings that stalled the management plan in the CWD case.  
6.3 Structural limitations to resilience in governance networks 
 
 Adapting a model intended for organizations to governance networks has provided a 
heretofore unexamined perspective on resilience in governance networks. The results of this 
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research are a good starting point to discover how other ad hoc governance networks are able to 
sustain their activities as well as provide insight for networks that are not making positive 
adjustments when they encounter conflict and stressors.  A wholesale adoption of a model from 
one setting to another is not without its challenges; in particular there are some issues faced by 
networks that are not part of the experience of a private organization and as such are not 
addressed by the original resilience model.  
The main disconnect between the private firm (discussed in the literature on resilience in 
organizations) and the governance network is the autonomy firms have to execute their planning 
and decisions in order to achieve their goals. Firms are obviously dependent on external factors 
(such as the regulatory environment, market, sales or venture capital) but the leadership of the 
firm can develop and execute a strategic direction with little interference from outside sources as 
long as it meets the objectives of the firm. The wildlife health network, on the other hand, is 
constrained in how much action it can take by multiple levels of authority, including provincial 
and federal governments. Without access to an independent stream of resources, the network is 
reliant on the approval of governments to authorize and fund their activities. This limits the 
ability of the network to be resilient, as the ability to address new issues will always have to pass 
through a bureaucratic or regulatory approval process, unless the network one day formalizes 
their activities and develops into a more traditional organization. Unless the network has a 
dedicated source of financial and social resources with which it can reorganize to suit its needs, it 
is highly reliant on external stakeholders which can place its resilience at risk. 
A further challenge that is not accounted for in the current resilience model, but would be 
valuable to explore in a more systematic manner, is how governance network members negotiate 
the terrain between their collaborative work in the network environment and the more traditional 
bureaucratic environment with which they must engage for access to authority and financial 
resources. The nature of governance networks, particularly in a federal system, requires a certain 
level of cooperation between various levels of government and non-governmental agencies. 
These formal institutions will often use a command and control system, which organizational 
theorists argue is not particularly adaptive when facing stressors as there is limited situation 
awareness and adaptive capacity (McManus et al., 2008). A network that expects to succeed in 
generating positive policy outcomes is required to engage with these traditional institutions while 
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maintaining the characteristics that contribute to a successful and resilient collaborative 
enterprise: knowledge-seeking behaviour, adaptability, deference to expertise and flexibility.  
 Overall, the network resilience model has provided a useful starting point to conceive of 
resilience for governance networks. Future research in network resilience would benefit from 
including the aforementioned concept of learned experience in a more overt manner as a factor 
that contributes to successful positive adjustments. Resilience is better conceived of as a 
reflexive concept where our knowledge and abilities affect how we use it; how we use it further 
reinforces our abilities, ideally equipping us to have a higher capacity to make further positive 
adjustments. Further examination of how resilient characteristics displayed by individual actors 
influence the network would be of value, as greater insight into how better to engender highly 
resilience characteristics both individually and network-wide would be useful. A revised and 
refined resilience model for networks needs to acknowledge that resilience is not a binary state: 
an individual in the network or the totality of the network itself has a range of capacity for 
resilient attitudes and behaviors that will, given the effort, grow over time. 
 Developing a model that explores both the actions and the attitudes of the network has 
provided insight into how some networks continue to collaborate and produce policy outputs 
despite having little to no obligation to do so. The wildlife health network in Canada has 
developed out of the sense of responsibility professional biologists and academics felt to fill the 
gaps in health policy around emerging wildlife and zoonotic diseases. The orientation of this 
group is toward ongoing learning, through their own work and the work of their colleagues. 
Along with this information seeking behaviour, there is a fundamental awareness of the 
disadvantaged position they are in with regards to the priorities of funding agencies and 
governments. This knowledge shapes network activities towards a realistic perspective where 
failure is acknowledged, allowing the group to not be blindsided when things do not go their 
way. This perspective, unfortunately, has not always translated to adequate planning to overcome 
setbacks but it is obvious that the network has improved its practices to better deal with 
obstacles. 
 Defining resilience as the ability to make positive adjustments during challenging 
circumstances and assessing resilience through the network’s ability to have slack in resources, 
adaptive capacity and situation awareness has provided the opportunity to evaluate a network in 
a substantive fashion. Behaviours that are valuable to network resilience have been identified, as 
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well as structural and cognitive limitations that restrict the types of actions and decisions that a 
network can make. Any future iteration of a network resilience model will have to account for 
the limitations that organizational resilience presents to network theory. Networks that do not 
have operational funding and require outside authority to support their work can potentially face 
serious limitations in their ability to achieve their goals. The presence of resilient attitudes and 
actions will help networks mitigate some of the uncertainty around their continued existence but 
the presence of a supportive government will always be a necessity.  
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